EQUIPMENT THEREFOR

Technical field

This invention relates to the design of access systems most often used for unlocking and locking vehicles and describes a new method for securing passive keyless systems used in particular for means of transport and the equipment used for this method comprising an external remote control and an internal communication module.

Current state of the art

Vehicle access systems can be divided into active systems, where a key must be inserted into the lock or a button on the controller pressed, and passive, where it is not necessary to insert a key in the lock or press a button on the controller. The first type of the active access systems is based solely on the mechanical use of the key, which must always be inserted into the lock to unlock or lock the door and to start the vehicle. The second type of the active access systems uses a combination of a physical key and a RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) immobilizer built into the vehicle, where a key has to be inserted into the lock to unlock or lock the door, similarly to starting a vehicle, while the key is verified by RFID technology. The advantage of this system is that it increases the protection against unauthorised use of a vehicle and that no battery has to be installed in the key. The third type of the active access system, referred to as RKE (Remote Keyless Entry), consists of a physical key supplemented with a remote control and an RFID immobilizer built into the vehicle, where the vehicle door is unlocked and locked by means of radio frequency. A high frequency signal (315 or 433 or 868 MHz) is transmitted from the remote control by pressing the appropriate button so that the user can unlock or lock the vehicle at a greater distance. To start the vehicle, the key has to be inserted into the starter, where it is verified by RFID technology and then is it possible to start the engine.

This passive keyless entry and start system (PKES) no longer requires a physical key to be inserted into the door lock or the starter; the user provided with a remote control only needs to pull a door handle or press the button on the door handle, whereupon the remote control and the vehicle module exchange data over the radio frequency and unlock the lock. The vehicle is started in the same way: after the start button is pressed, the same communication between the controller and the module takes place and when the data is verified, the vehicle motor can be started. With its set of antennas, the PKES system can detect where the controller is located; if it is inside the vehicle, it allows starting it, if it is outside the vehicle at a distance of 1 to 2 meters, it allows the vehicle to be opened only by pulling the handle or pressing the button on the door. If the remote control is located outside the vehicle at a longer distance (up to 100 m), the door can be unlocked or locked by pressing the appropriate button on the remote control. The system allows for a high level of user comfort for the vehicle owner, but due to the rapid development of communication technology, it also poses a significant security threat in the form of unauthorised entry into the vehicle (Relay Attack) and its theft. There are methods described whereby a signal transmitted between the remote control and the module can be captured by means of special portable devices, transmitted to a second controller by another frequency without affecting the content of the information, and then the controller can be used for communication with the module inside the vehicle to allow for opening and starting the vehicle. Therefore, there are efforts to develop new security systems that would ensure maximum protection of passive keyless access systems.

There is, for example, the solution described in US6747545 (Passive Keyless Entry System), where increased safety is achieved by increasing the number of antenna coils for LF (Low Frequency) channels or the number of UHF (Ultra High Frequency) receivers. The module in the vehicle and the electronic key passively communicate in this solution via a secured line using low and high frequency. This protection is no longer efficient and effective due to the level of sophisticated equipment used in theft to unlock or override securing systems. EP3077254 (Vehicle Control System to Prevent Relay Attack) describes the protection against unauthorized opening of a vehicle by the Relay Unit Attack method using high-frequency and low-frequency communication via a secured line, while analysing the magnet vectors and angles created by multiple antennas mounted on the vehicle. This solution may not be reliable in real conditions and may cause loss of comfort of this type of system due to environmental conditions and magnetic signal throughput. Magnetic wave imitation close to the key from the side of the thief is as real as stretching the high frequency wave, so this solution may not be effective against the aforementioned method. In the solution according to US20070188301 (Keyless Entry System), the security of the access system is based on a time-limited length of communication and the associated strength of the received signal. In this case, the vehicle transmits a periodic signal and the key receives the signal and responds. If the data (i.e. time, received signal intensity, and authorization data) in the vehicle key response match, the access is allowed. This system is no longer resistant to the currently used Relay Unit Attack method because of the precise design of the device used for stealing a vehicle. These devices are nowadays able to transfer data in such time so as to conceal that it is an attempt at theft. Finally, there is a solution known according to CN201611127194 (Method for Detecting Relay Attack to Wireless Authentication Based on Pressure Matching), which describes how to prevent Relay Unit Attack on a vehicle. The protection method is based on the principle of evaluating excessive pulling at the vehicle door handle with the aim of sending an activation signal from the vehicle. If excessive pulling at the door handle within a time interval is detected, this is evaluated by the vehicle as an attempt at the Relay Unit Attack and the access is rejected. However, this method may not be effective if high quality equipment for vehicle theft is applied.

The system according to US2015302673 A1 (Relay Attack Prevention for Passive Entry/for Passive Start Systems) uses primarily the values of RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator), which are the strength values of the received signal, that can be used to determine the distance from the vehicle and the values measured by the accelerometer. Once the key is at a certain distance from the car, it detects the RSSI signal strength and the accelerometer values at t1 time and then, after a period of time, it measures the same values at t2 time. Based on the difference between these two times, it determines whether the Relay Unit Attack method has been used to steal the vehicle. This method is unreliable due to the number of different signals in the surrounding and thus unexpected fluctuations mainly in RSSI values may occur due to which the system may not function as expected; the values may be unreasonably large or small which may also prevent access to an authorized owner. This system is functional rather in laboratory conditions where the surrounding influences are not that variable. The system according to US2016075307 (Relay Attack Inhibiting) describes communication between the key and the vehicle, where the communication is started by the key asking the vehicle for authorization parameters for the given function. It is unusual for the systems of this type that communication is started by the key. The key, depending on the required vehicle function obtained in the mutual communication with the vehicle, sends the required measured data associated with the required vehicle authorization parameter. The vehicle compares the data obtained, such as the direction and extent of the key movement, the direction of the signal transmitted to the key, or whether the data conforms to the desired vehicle function or not. If all these parameters compared on the vehicle side are satisfactory, the access is allowed, if not, the access for the given function is denied. This system may not be completely reliable, since the authorized person may have the key in his pocket, backpack or other type of luggage and so the direction, extent and other parameters of movement may not be similar to those measured or expected by the vehicle and the comparison may fail at this point. The same applies to the direction of the received signal from the key side, which may not correspond to the expected values. The probability that all these parameters will match and the access will be allowed is very small. The data measured by the key is probably saved in the external memory continuously, according to the diagram, which results in high power consumption and rapid discharge of the accumulator due to the high processor activity when logging data. Proper functioning of this system can rather be ensured in laboratory conditions only.

WO2016202592A1 describes measures against theft applying the Relay Attack Unit method by establishing the exact position of the key and its trajectory when approaching the vehicle, which is obtained by directly comparing the trilateration results with the values of the motion sensors obtained at certain time intervals. The data compared must meet a certain tolerance/deviation. This solution is disadvantageous because it requires at least one moment in the access to the vehicle at which the key does not move, which is a safety hazard because, for example, a key in a box behind the door will not move. Thus, it will show zero values that are required in the solution and with certain arrangement of transmitters for position identification by means of trilateration around the house conformance in the position comparison may occur, allowing for opening the door and starting the vehicle. The most common solution currently used in vehicles, with a few exceptions, is the solution where the activation signal is only sent after the vehicle handle is pulled and so this solution could pose a high security risk. The solution according to W02017207050A1 describes protection against theft of a vehicle by applying the Relay Attack Unit method by establishing the exact location of the key and its trajectory when approaching the vehicle, which are obtained by comparing the triangulation results with the values of the received RSSI signal strength, magnetic vectors and/or motion sensors at specified time intervals. These comparisons, however, must meet a certain tolerance/deviation so that the values obtained can be considered valid and allow for successful authorization. The disadvantage of this solution lies in its unreliability. Due to the large number of verification factors, fixed time windows and a variety of equipment using the same communication band (125 KHz etc.), among others also other vehicles in the surroundings, there is also a high risk that some of the above conditions required for proper authorization will be evaluated incorrectly and the vehicle owner will not be able to get in it. For example, in a car park where there are 5 or more cars parked close to each other which use the same system.

The aim of the present invention is to introduce a new equipment which increases the level of security of passive keyless systems against unauthorized entry and handling in comparison with previously known and used methods, where one part of the equipment is formed by a base, which can be, for example, a vehicle, house, etc., and the second part is a portable device, such as an electronic key. Through mutual wireless communication at both low and high frequencies these devices exchange information to allow access and handling to authorized persons only. This effect is achieved by means of motion sensors, tolerance range, cyclic memory/cyclic queue, and the capability of the key to recognize its position (inside, outside). A great advantage of this method is the possibility to choose the side where the method will be evaluated, whether on the key side or on the vehicle side. The possibility to use the cyclic memory/cyclic queue is a key factor in reducing power consumption from the accumulator, which is a very important parameter in the automotive industry. An important part of this method is the requirement that the function inside is preceded by the function outside, which will increase security in case of violent intrusion into the vehicle or in an unusual way for the usual course of Relay Unit Attack method.

Summary of the invention The stated aim is achieved to a large extent by the invention, which is a method for securing passive keyless systems used in particular for means of transport and consisting of a vehicle module installed inside a vehicle and a mobile module, which are interconnected in a wireless low frequency and high frequency manner, the nature of the invention being that motion data of the mobile module is recorded by means of motion sensors in the memory block and it is evaluated based on predefined tolerance ranges in the motion data evaluation block to verify the position of the mobile module in relation to the vehicle module, which is anticipated based on the interactions performed with the vehicle, whereby it is ensured that without the prior execution of the function, i.e. successful verification the anticipated position for the status of the mobile module outside the vehicle module, the function, which is successful verification of the anticipated position for the status of the mobile module inside the vehicle module, cannot be performed, so if the anticipated position is evaluated as false, the communication is interrupted, while if the position is evaluated as true, further communication between the mobile module and the vehicle module is permitted.

It is preferable, if the motion data is written into the memory block as a cyclic queue and if the motion data is verified either on the side of the vehicle module or on the side of the mobile module depending on the position of the motion data evaluation block.

Another aspect of the invention is equipment for securing passive keyless systems used in particular for means of transport and comprising a vehicle module installed in a vehicle and a mobile module, which are interconnected in a wireless low frequency and high frequency manner, where the vehicle module comprises at least a fixed communication block connected to the vehicle control unit and the mobile module comprises a power supply and evaluation and control block provided with at least the main control unit to which at least the primary communication block and the memory block are connected. The evaluation and control block is equipped with a block of motion sensors, which is connected to the main control unit via the memory block, with a motion data evaluation block installed either between the main control unit and the memory block or in the vehicle module and with a block of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside installed either in the evaluation and control block with parallel connection to the main control unit or in the vehicle module, where in the vehicle module the motion data evaluation block and the block of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside are interconnected with the vehicle control unit. It is preferable, if an RSSI block is connected in parallel to the main control unit and a control element is connected in parallel to the main control unit, the block of motion sensors consisting of an accelerometer and/or a gyroscope.

The new equipment achieves a new and higher effect in that the new connection makes use of the properties of the motion sensors in relation to the key and the ability of the key to recognize its position inside or outside the vehicle. These elements, combined with special decision-making algorithms, which are given by way of example only and may be developed otherwise by the manufacturer, reduce the likelihood of vehicle theft by applying the above Relay Unit Attack method. This solution is easy to implement into existing architecture, i.e. connection, keys. Its application in the field is feasible due to the reliability of the function under normal operating conditions, its dimensions and only slight increase in power consumption from the accumulator.

Explanation of drawings

Specific embodiments of the invention are schematically represented in the accompanying drawings, wherein

Fig. 1 is a diagram of the basic connection of the equipment with two versions of the location of the primary communication block

Fig. 2 is a diagram of an alternative connection of the equipment shown in Fig. 1 complemented with a control element,

Fig. 3 is a diagram of an alternative connection of the equipment with some elements transferred into the vehicle,

Fig. 4 is a diagram of an alternative connection of the equipment shown in Fig. 3 complemented with a control element,

Fig. 5 is a diagram of an algorithm controlling the equipment operation, when the short frequency activation signal is transmitted from the vehicle after the vehicle user interaction and

Fig. 6 is a diagram of an algorithm controlling the equipment operation, when the short frequency activation signal is transmitted from the vehicle independent of the vehicle user interaction. The drawings showing the present invention and the following examples of specific embodiments do not limit in any way the scope of protection set forth in the definition, but merely illustrate the nature of the invention.

Examples of the invention

The equipment for securing passive keyless systems in the basic embodiment shown in Fig. 1 consists of the vehicle module 1 installed inside the vehicle and the mobile module 2, “key”, which are connected in a wireless manner. The vehicle module 1 comprises interconnected fixed communication block 14 and control unit 12 of the vehicle, that are connected to the vehicle electrical system, from which they are also powered. The mobile module 2 consists of the power supply 21, preferably an accumulator, and the evaluation and control block 22. The evaluation and control block 2 comprises the main control unit 221. preferably a processor or microcontroller, connected in parallel to the primary communication block 222, RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator) block 223. block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside and block 225 of motion data evaluation. The block 225 of motion data evaluation is connected in series to the memory block 226 and motion sensor block 227. which is preferably a gyroscope and/or accelerometer. Mutual communication between the vehicle module 1 and mobile module 2 is realized by wireless connection of the fixed communication block H and the primary communication block 222. where the primary communication block 222 can also be located outside the evaluation and control block 22, as shown in dashed line in Fig. 1 The communication blocks H and 222 include transmitters and receivers (not shown) enabling LF and/or UFIF communication, such as low frequency antennas, high frequency antennas, low frequency transmitters/receivers, high frequency transmitters/receivers or elements for communication via Bluetooth, etc. The memory unit in the memory block 226 can be implemented as a cyclic queue/cyclic memory

In an alternative embodiment of the equipment shown in Fig. 2, the evaluation and control block 22 is equipped with a control element 228 connected to the main control unit 221. Without affecting the overall function of the equipment, the block of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside 224 and the motion data evaluation block 225 may be located in the vehicle module 1 and connected to the vehicle control unit 12 as shown in Fig. 3. In this embodiment of the equipment, it is not necessary to install the RSSI block 223 in the evaluation and control block 22. An alternative embodiment of the equipment from Fig. 3 complemented with the control element 228 is shown in Fig. 4. The parts of the described equipment have the following features:

The motion data evaluation block 225 has specified tolerance ranges, which may differ for situations when the mobile module 2 is located inside the vehicle or outside the vehicle. The data recorded by the motion sensor block 227 is evaluated in the motion data evaluation block 225 at the moment determined by the user/manufacturer. The tolerance ranges are defined by the equipment user or manufacturer for individual conditions inside/outside the vehicle. An alternative solution may be sending the data measured by the motion sensor block 227 or data that has already been evaluated to the vehicle module 1 via a secure line intended for their processing and/or evaluation. The tolerance range can be one or more tolerance ranges and/or a set of methods/algorithms for comparing and evaluating data measured by the motion sensor block227.

The motion sensor block 227 is designed to record motion. The data thus obtained belongs to the mobile module 2 and it is stored in the memory block 226. As motion recording affects the power consumption from the power supply 21 , the effort is to record the data with minimum power consumption. The best solution is to record this data in the memory block 226 which is a cyclic memory/cyclic queue. The amount of the data stored depends on the frequency of measurement and the data types used save the measured values. If the cyclic queue is used, the data is stored so that after filling the memory block 226 with measured values, i.e. after a period of time, the oldest measured values are replaced by the most recent values. The memory capacity and/or measurement frequency is determined by the user/manufacturer so that they can access all the measured values over a past period (1 ,2,3... n past seconds, or within a period of time they deem appropriate). The data stored in a cyclic queue and/or otherwise in the memory block 226 is further processed by the main control unit 221 and/or the motion data evaluation block 225. The main control unit 221 and/or the motion data evaluation block 225 processes data measured by the motion sensor block 227 and stored in the memory block 226. The main control unit 221 also uses data determining the location of the mobile module 2, can be determined based on the values measured by the RSSI (Receive Signal Strength Indicator) block 223 and/or data received from the vehicle module 1. Alternatively, the location of the mobile module 2 may be determined on the vehicle side and announced in reverse communication. The main control unit 221 determines, based on the motion data evaluation block 225. the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside and/or RSSI block 223. whether it will continue in communication or terminate communication. The algorithms listed below are not a prerequisite for operation and are presented as indicative examples only.

By using this method, the theft of the vehicle is prevented, if an attempt at applying the Relay Unit Attack method is made. The great advantage of this method is the versatility of its use; it can be applied during communication both on the side of the mobile module 2, i.e. the key, and on side of the vehicle.

Appropriate use of the motion sensor block sleep mode may result in reduced power consumption, thereby saving the power supply. The principles for switching the motion sensor block 227 to the sleep mode will be determined by the user/manufacturer of the equipment due to the number of various ways and they depend on its requirements. Switching the motion sensor block 227 to the sleep mode does not affect the operation of any other parts of the equipment. The motion sensors do not have to affect the activation of the main control unit 221 and the circuit itself. The circuit can be activated by receiving low frequency data through the primary communication block 222 and/or in any other manner that results in the circuit activation and which is selected by the user/manufacturer, or the equipment can be activated regardless of whether the mobile module 2 is in motion or not. The motion sensors only affect the course of communication within the control algorithms No.1 and No.2.

In the example of the use of algorithm 1 shown in Fig. 5, the motion sensor block 227 may record motion as long as it is active, i.e. when it is not in the sleep mode. In the sleep mode, limited amount of data may also be recorded and/or no data recording may not occur at all. In the case of algorithm 2, the motion sensors can be in the sleep mode all the time to save power and can only be started after switching the circuit to the active mode, depending on the user/manufacturer. In algorithm 2, the condition for switching the circuit into the active mode is fulfilled by the vehicle by periodically transmitting the authorization data from the fixed communication block 11, that the circuit of the mobile module 2 must accept.

Algorithm 1 uses the location of the mobile module 2 (key) in relation to the vehicle, i.e. outside/inside, and the data measured by the motion sensor block 227. This algorithm is intended for a situation when a short frequency activation impulse occurs due to an interaction of the vehicle user/owner. The appropriate part of the algorithm determines whether the key is outside or inside the vehicle. This requires data obtained from the vehicle, where the data can be identical and/or similar to the data representing operations performed by the user outside the vehicle/inside the vehicle, and/or data determining the location of the key (outside, inside the vehicle) and/or the values measured by the RSSI block 223. If the condition is outside the vehicle, it is necessary to decide whether the data measured by the motion sensor block 227 falls within the defined tolerance range specified by the user/manufacturer for the outside condition, if the values for the outside condition measured on the motion sensors could be similar to the values of a person in motion, i.e. walking, running, etc. This range is defined in the motion data evaluation block 225. The motion data evaluation block 225 reads the data measured by the motion sensor block 22Z from the memory block 226 where it is saved, and this data is then compared with the defined tolerance range. If at least one or more values saved in the memory block 226 in the selected time interval chosen in the motion data evaluation block 225 for comparison falls within the defined tolerance range, then this condition is evaluated as true and the algorithm continues. If neither of the values selected for comparison falls within the defined tolerance range, then this condition is evaluated as false and the process is terminated.

The algorithm still needs to decide whether the value saved in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside is 0. This value is not necessarily 0, depending on the user’s/manufacturer’s interpretation, because it is a binary state determination that is saved in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside and is used for further functions of the algorithm. If the value saved in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside equals to the binary state 0, then the condition is evaluated as true and this value in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside is changed to binary state value 1 and the algorithm continues in communication. If the value saved in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside does not equal to the binary state 0, then this condition is evaluated as false because the binary value saved in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside is 1 , this status is subsequently changed in the memory to binary state value 0 and the algorithm continues.

If status inside the vehicle is detected, it is necessary to evaluate whether the binary state with the value 1 is saved in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside. If the condition is evaluated as false, the process is terminated. If the condition is evaluated as true, it has to be decided whether the data measured by the motion sensors falls within a defined tolerance range determined by the user/manufacturer for the inside condition, if the values for the inside condition measured at the motion sensors could be similar to the values of a person not in motion, i.e. when sitting, etc. This range is defined in the motion data evaluation block 225. which reads only the most recent data measured by the motion sensor block 227 from the memory block 226 where the data is saved. This data is then compared with the defined tolerance range, and if the data read by the main control unit 221 loaded from the memory block 226 for comparison falls within the defined tolerance range, then the condition is evaluated as true and the process continues in communication. If the condition is evaluated as false, the process is terminated.

Algorithm 2 shown in Fig. 6 uses the location of the key in relation to the vehicle, i.e. outside/inside, and the data measured by the motion sensor block 227. This algorithm is intended for a situation when the vehicle continuously transmits a low frequency activation signal at intervals defined by the user/manufacturer. The appropriate part of the algorithm determines whether the key is located outside or inside the vehicle. This requires data obtained from the vehicle, where the data can be identical and/or similar to the data representing operations performed by the user outside the vehicle/inside the vehicle, and/or data determining the location of the key (outside, inside the vehicle) and/or the values measured by the RSSI block 223. If the condition is outside the vehicle, it is necessary to decide whether the value of the binary state saved in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside is 1. If this condition is evaluated as true, it means that it is not the primary communication with the vehicle, but a 2,3,4... n communication process. The number of these processes depends on the frequency of the transmitted low frequency signal from the vehicle, thus this part of the algorithm starts monitoring the number of communication processes and/or the received low frequency signal/data. If the communication between the vehicle and the key is lost after the user/manufacturer-defined time, i.e. the key will not be located inside or around the vehicle for a defined period of time and will not receive any data, the value of the binary state in block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside will be changed to 0. For example, the user comes to the vehicle and if the required conditions are met, the value 1 will be recorded. The value 1 remains as long as the user is in the defined area of the vehicle or inside the vehicle. Once the user moves away from the vehicle, the key does not detect any communication with the vehicle, thus deducing that it is out of range and the value of the binary state in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside is changed to 0 and the process continues if it is allowed to continue in the algorithm process for the time of monitoring. If this condition is evaluated as false, it is necessary to decide whether the data measured by the motion sensor block 227 falls within the defined tolerance range specified by the user/manufacturer for the outside condition. The values measured at the motion sensors for the outside condition could resemble the values of a person moving, i.e. walking, running, etc. This range is defined in the motion data evaluation block 225. The motion data evaluation block 225 reads the data measured by the motion sensor block 227 from the memory block 226 where it is saved. This data is then compared with the defined tolerance range and if at least one or more values saved in the memory block 226 in the selected time interval chosen in the motion data evaluation block 225 for comparison falls within the defined tolerance range, then the condition is evaluated as true and the algorithm continues. If neither of the values selected for comparison falls within the defined tolerance range, then this condition is evaluated as false and the process is terminated.

The algorithm still needs to decide whether the value saved in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside is 0. This value is not necessarily 0, depending on the user’s/manufacturer’s interpretation, because it is a binary state determination that is saved in the memory and is used for further functions of the algorithm. If the value saved in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside equals to the binary state 0, then the condition is evaluated as true and this value in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside is changed to binary state value 1 and the algorithm continues in communication. If the value saved in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside does not equal to the binary state 0, then this condition is evaluated as false because the binary value saved in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside is 1 , this status is subsequently changed in the memory to binary state value 0 and the algorithm continues.

If status inside the vehicle is detected, it is necessary to evaluate whether the binary state with the value 1 is saved in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside. If the condition is evaluated as false, the process is terminated. If the condition is evaluated as true, it has to be decided whether the data measured by the motion sensors falls within a defined tolerance range determined by the user/manufacturer for the inside condition, if the values for the inside condition measured at the motion sensors could be similar to the values of a person not in motion, i.e. when sitting, etc. This range is defined in the motion data evaluation block 225, which reads only the most recent data measured by the motion sensor block 227 from the memory block 226 where the data is saved. This data is then compared with the defined tolerance range, and if the data loaded by the motion data evaluation block 225 from the memory block 226 for comparison falls within the defined tolerance range, then the condition is evaluated as true and the process continues in communication. If the condition is evaluated as false, the process is terminated.

By logging the values, that is the two possible states mentioned above, the situations are addressed leading to unauthorized handling of the vehicle in a non-standard way, which is not expected in the Relay Attack Unit. Any combination of the individual parts of these algorithms depends on the user/manufacturer. Individual parts of the algorithm can be used separately.

In case of interaction with the control element 228, whose function is to open the vehicle (door, suitcase, etc.), the value of the binary state entered in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside is 1. In case of interaction with the control element 228, whose function is to lock the vehicle (door, suitcase, etc.), the value of the binary state entered in the block 224 of the sequence of actions performed inside/outside is 0. These values are not necessarily 0 and/or 1 , depending on the user’s/manufacturer’s interpretation, when it is a binary state determination that is saved in the memory and is used for further functions of the algorithm.

Industrial use

The method for securing passive keyless systems and the equipment for this method relate to the design of access systems most often used for authorised access and handling of vehicles and they are intended in particular for means of transport provided with an external remote control and an internal communication module.