PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY FOR PROBABILISTIC-SHAPING CODING

SCHEMES

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

[0001] This application claims priority to Greek Patent Application No. 20220100642, filed August 4, 2022, which is assigned to the assignee hereof and hereby expressly incorporated by reference in its entirety as if fully set forth below and for all applicable purposes.

BACKGROUND

Field of the Disclosure

[0002] Aspects of the present disclosure relate to wireless communications, and more particularly, to techniques for securing physical (PHY) layer communications.

Description of Related Art

[0003] Wireless communications systems are widely deployed to provide various telecommunication services such as telephony, video, data, messaging, broadcasts, or other similar types of services. These wireless communications systems may employ multiple-access technologies capable of supporting communications with multiple users by sharing available wireless communications system resources with those users.

[0004] Although wireless communications systems have made great technological advancements over many years, challenges still exist. For example, complex and dynamic environments can still attenuate or block signals between wireless transmitters and wireless receivers. Accordingly, there is a continuous desire to improve the technical performance of wireless communications systems, including, for example: improving speed and data carrying capacity of communications, improving efficiency of the use of shared communications mediums, reducing power used by transmitters and receivers while performing communications, improving reliability of wireless communications, avoiding redundant transmissions and/or receptions and related processing, improving the coverage area of wireless communications, increasing the number and types of devices that can access wireless communications systems, increasing the ability for different types of devices to intercommunicate, increasing the number and type of wireless communications mediums available for use, and the like. Consequently, there exists a need for further improvements in wireless communications systems to overcome the aforementioned technical challenges and others.

SUMMARY

[0005] One aspect provides a method for wireless communication by a transmitter. The method includes obtaining a sequence of information bits; performing physical layer processing to generate a sequence of shaped symbols from the sequence of information bits using a probabilistic shaper function; providing security for transmission of the sequence of shaped symbols using at least one code during the physical layer processing; and transmitting the sequence of shaped symbols to a receiver.

[0006] Another aspect provides a method for wireless communications by a receiver. The method includes receiving a sequence of shaped symbols from a transmitter; obtaining at least one code used to provide security for the sequence of shaped symbols; and performing physical layer processing to recover a sequence of information bits from the sequence of shaped symbols, using a probabilistic deshaper function and the at least one code.

[0007] Other aspects provide: an apparatus operable, configured, or otherwise adapted to perform any one or more of the aforementioned methods and/or those described elsewhere herein; a non-transitory, computer-readable media comprising instructions that, when executed by a processor of an apparatus, cause the apparatus to perform the aforementioned methods as well as those described elsewhere herein; a computer program product embodied on a computer-readable storage medium comprising code for performing the aforementioned methods as well as those described elsewhere herein; and/or an apparatus comprising means for performing the aforementioned methods as well as those described elsewhere herein. By way of example, an apparatus may comprise a processing system, a device with a processing system, or processing systems cooperating over one or more networks.

[0008] The following description and the appended figures set forth certain features for purposes of illustration.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0009] The appended figures depict certain features of the various aspects described herein and are not to be considered limiting of the scope of this disclosure. [0010] FIG. 1 depicts an example wireless communications network.

[0011] FIG. 2 depicts an example disaggregated base station architecture.

[0012] FIG. 3 depicts aspects of an example base station and an example user equipment.

[0013] FIGS. 4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D depict various example aspects of data structures for a wireless communications network.

[0014] FIG. 5 depicts a table illustrating how unprotected communications could impact performance.

[0015] FIG. 6 depicts an example scenario in which aspects of the present disclosure may enhance security.

[0016] FIG. 7 depicts a block diagram illustrating an example transmitter processing flow.

[0017] FIG. 8 depicts an example bit sequence mapping for a modulation signal.

[0018] FIG. 9 depicts a block diagram illustrating an example transmitter processing flow with a probabilistic shaper.

[0019] FIGs. 10A and 10B depict examples of how to provide security to a transmitter with a probabilistic shaper, in accordance with aspects of the present disclosure.

[0020] FIGs. 11A and 11B depict examples of how to generate and verify signature bits, in accordance with aspects of the present disclosure.

[0021] FIG. 11C summarizes various options for a signature, in accordance with aspects of the present disclosure.

[0022] FIGs. 12 and 13 depict examples of how to incorporate signature bits in a transmitter with a probabilistic shaper, in accordance with aspects of the present disclosure.

[0023] FIGs. 14A and 14B depict examples of how to generate signature bits, in accordance with aspects of the present disclosure.

[0024] FIG. 15 depicts a method for wireless communications.

[0025] FIG. 16 depicts a method for wireless communications. [0026] FIG. 17 depicts aspects of an example communications device.

[0027] FIG. 18 depicts aspects of an example communications device.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0028] Aspects of the present disclosure provide apparatuses, methods, processing systems, and computer-readable mediums for enhancing security of wireless transmissions.

[0029] Communication over a channel is possible if the transmission rate over the channel satisfies a capacity based on the transmission power and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). The Shannon Capacity refers to a theorem that defines a maximum amount of information that can be transmitted over a channel (e.g. a wireless channel). Traditionally used coded modulation (CM) techniques, such as amplitude shift keying (ASK) and quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM), have signal constellations that are characterized by equidistant signal points and uniform signaling (e.g., a non-Gaussian distribution of information), meaning each signal point is transmitted with a same probability. Unfortunately, uniform signaling may optimistically achieve an achievable information rate (AIR) that is 1.53 dB (0.255 bits per dimension (bit/l-D)) away from the capacity of the AWGN channel (sometimes referred to as the “shaping gap”).

[0030] To close the shaping gap and to increase spectral efficiency, signal shaping techniques may be applied to generate a non-uniform distribution of the information. For example, in geometric shaping, constellation points are arranged in the complex plane in a non-equidistant manner to mimic a capacity achieving distribution. Probabilistic shaping, on the other hand, starts with a constellation with equidistant signal points (e.g., ASK or QAM) but assigns different probabilities to different constellation points.

[0031] Examples of probabilistic shaping including trellis shaping and shell mapping. Probabilistic amplitude shaping (PAS) is another technique for employing probabilistic shaping that has achieved high throughput for commercial use in optical core networks (e.g., over 10 GB/second). Probabilistic shaping offers low-complexity and flexible integration with existing coding schemes. PAS generally provides low-complexity integration of amplitude shaping into existing binary forward error correction (FEC) systems and large shaping gain and inherent rate adaptation functionality. [0032] While techniques such as probabilistic shaping may help increase spectral efficiency of wireless communications, secure communications are very important in many wireless communications systems. For example, in wireless communications systems involving Internet of Things (loT) devices (e.g., in a factory automation scenario), security may be crucial since many devices will be connected to each other. Given the level of importance of data obtained from loT devices, adding security via one or more mechanisms may be beneficial.

[0033] Aspects of the present disclosure, provide PHY layer security (PLS) schemes to wireless transmissions based on probabilistic shaping. By utilizing the security mechanisms proposed herein to secure wireless transmissions, eavesdropping attacks may be prevented, which may help avoid the negative impact on system performance often associated with such attacks.

Introduction to Wireless Communications Networks

[0034] The techniques and methods described herein may be used for various wireless communications networks. While aspects may be described herein using terminology commonly associated with 3G, 4G, and/or 5G wireless technologies, aspects of the present disclosure may likewise be applicable to other communications systems and standards not explicitly mentioned herein.

[0035] FIG. 1 depicts an example of a wireless communications network 100, in which aspects described herein may be implemented.

[0036] Generally, wireless communications network 100 includes various network entities (alternatively, network elements or network nodes). A network entity is generally a communications device and/or a communications function performed by a communications device (e.g., a user equipment (UE), a base station (BS), a component of a BS, a server, etc.). For example, various functions of a network as well as various devices associated with and interacting with a network may be considered network entities. Further, wireless communications network 100 includes terrestrial aspects, such as ground-based network entities (e.g., BSs 102), and non-terrestrial aspects, such as satellite 140 and aircraft 145, which may include network entities on-board (e.g., one or more BSs) capable of communicating with other network elements (e.g., terrestrial BSs) and user equipments. [0037] In the depicted example, wireless communications network 100 includes BSs 102, UEs 104, and one or more core networks, such as an Evolved Packet Core (EPC) 160 and 5G Core (5GC) network 190, which interoperate to provide communications services over various communications links, including wired and wireless links.

[0038] FIG. 1 depicts various example UEs 104, which may more generally include: a cellular phone, smart phone, session initiation protocol (SIP) phone, laptop, personal digital assistant (PDA), satellite radio, global positioning system, multimedia device, video device, digital audio player, camera, game console, tablet, smart device, wearable device, vehicle, electric meter, gas pump, large or small kitchen appliance, healthcare device, implant, sensor/actuator, display, internet of things (loT) devices, always on (AON) devices, edge processing devices, or other similar devices. UEs 104 may also be referred to more generally as a mobile device, a wireless device, a wireless communications device, a station, a mobile station, a subscriber station, a mobile subscriber station, a mobile unit, a subscriber unit, a wireless unit, a remote unit, a remote device, an access terminal, a mobile terminal, a wireless terminal, a remote terminal, a handset, and others.

[0039] BSs 102 wirelessly communicate with (e.g., transmit signals to or receive signals from) UEs 104 via communications links 120. The communications links 120 between BSs 102 and UEs 104 may include uplink (UL) (also referred to as reverse link) transmissions from a UE 104 to a BS 102 and/or downlink (DL) (also referred to as forward link) transmissions from a BS 102 to a UE 104. The communications links 120 may use multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) antenna technology, including spatial multiplexing, beamforming, and/or transmit diversity in various aspects.

[0040] BSs 102 may generally include: a NodeB, enhanced NodeB (eNB), next generation enhanced NodeB (ng-eNB), next generation NodeB (gNB or gNodeB), access point, base transceiver station, radio base station, radio transceiver, transceiver function, transmission reception point, and/or others. Each of BSs 102 may provide communications coverage for a respective geographic coverage area 110, which may sometimes be referred to as a cell, and which may overlap in some cases (e.g., small cell 102’ may have a coverage area 110’ that overlaps the coverage area 110 of a macro cell). A BS may, for example, provide communications coverage for a macro cell (covering relatively large geographic area), a pico cell (covering relatively smaller geographic area, such as a sports stadium), a femto cell (relatively smaller geographic area (e.g., a home)), and/or other types of cells.

[0041] While BSs 102 are depicted in various aspects as unitary communications devices, BSs 102 may be implemented in various configurations. For example, one or more components of a base station may be disaggregated, including a central unit (CU), one or more distributed units (DUs), one or more radio units (RUs), a Near-Real Time (Near-RT) RAN Intelligent Controller (RIC), or a Non-Real Time (Non-RT) RIC, to name a few examples. In another example, various aspects of a base station may be virtualized. More generally, a base station (e.g., BS 102) may include components that are located at a single physical location or components located at various physical locations. In examples in which a base station includes components that are located at various physical locations, the various components may each perform functions such that, collectively, the various components achieve functionality that is similar to a base station that is located at a single physical location. In some aspects, a base station including components that are located at various physical locations may be referred to as a disaggregated radio access network architecture, such as an Open RAN (O-RAN) or Virtualized RAN (VRAN) architecture. FIG. 2 depicts and describes an example disaggregated base station architecture.

[0042] Different BSs 102 within wireless communications network 100 may also be configured to support different radio access technologies, such as 3G, 4G, and/or 5G. For example, BSs 102 configured for 4G LTE (collectively referred to as Evolved Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E- UTRAN)) may interface with the EPC 160 through first backhaul links 132 (e.g., an SI interface). BSs 102 configured for 5G (e.g., 5G NR or Next Generation RAN (NG-RAN)) may interface with 5GC 190 through second backhaul links 184. BSs 102 may communicate directly or indirectly (e.g., through the EPC 160 or 5GC 190) with each other over third backhaul links 134 (e.g., X2 interface), which may be wired or wireless.

[0043] Wireless communications network 100 may subdivide the electromagnetic spectrum into various classes, bands, channels, or other features. In some aspects, the subdivision is provided based on wavelength and frequency, where frequency may also be referred to as a carrier, a subcarrier, a frequency channel, a tone, or a subband. For example, 3GPP currently defines Frequency Range 1 (FR1) as including 410 MHz - 7125 MHz, which is often referred to (interchangeably) as “Sub-6 GHz”. Similarly, 3GPP currently defines Frequency Range 2 (FR2) as including 24,250 MHz - 52,600 MHz, which is sometimes referred to (interchangeably) as a “millimeter wave” (“mmW” or “mmWave”). A base station configured to communicate using mmWave/near mmWave radio frequency bands (e.g., a mmWave base station such as BS 180) may utilize beamforming (e.g., 182) with a UE (e.g., 104) to improve path loss and range.

[0044] The communications links 120 between BSs 102 and, for example, UEs 104, may be through one or more carriers, which may have different bandwidths (e.g., 5, 10, 15, 20, 100, 400, and/or other MHz), and which may be aggregated in various aspects. Carriers may or may not be adjacent to each other. Allocation of carriers may be asymmetric with respect to DL and UL (e.g., more or fewer carriers may be allocated for DL than for UL).

[0045] Communications using higher frequency bands may have higher path loss and a shorter range compared to lower frequency communications. Accordingly, certain base stations (e.g., 180 in FIG. 1) may utilize beamforming 182 with a UE 104 to improve path loss and range. For example, BS 180 and the UE 104 may each include a plurality of antennas, such as antenna elements, antenna panels, and/or antenna arrays to facilitate the beamforming. In some cases, BS 180 may transmit a beamformed signal to UE 104 in one or more transmit directions 182’. UE 104 may receive the beamformed signal from the BS 180 in one or more receive directions 182”. UE 104 may also transmit a beamformed signal to the BS 180 in one or more transmit directions 182”. BS 180 may also receive the beamformed signal from UE 104 in one or more receive directions 182’. BS 180 and UE 104 may then perform beam training to determine the best receive and transmit directions for each of BS 180 and UE 104. Notably, the transmit and receive directions for BS 180 may or may not be the same. Similarly, the transmit and receive directions for UE 104 may or may not be the same.

[0046] Wireless communications network 100 further includes a Wi-Fi AP 150 in communication with Wi-Fi stations (STAs) 152 via communications links 154 in, for example, a 2.4 GHz and/or 5 GHz unlicensed frequency spectrum.

[0047] Certain UEs 104 may communicate with each other using device-to-device (D2D) communications link 158. D2D communications link 158 may use one or more sidelink channels, such as a physical sidelink broadcast channel (PSBCH), a physical sidelink discovery channel (PSDCH), a physical sidelink shared channel (PSSCH), a physical sidelink control channel (PSCCH), and/or a physical sidelink feedback channel (PSFCH).

[0048] EPC 160 may include various functional components, including: a Mobility Management Entity (MME) 162, other MMEs 164, a Serving Gateway 166, a Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service (MBMS) Gateway 168, a Broadcast Multicast Service Center (BM-SC) 170, and/or a Packet Data Network (PDN) Gateway 172, such as in the depicted example. MME 162 may be in communication with a Home Subscriber Server (HSS) 174. MME 162 is the control node that processes the signaling between the UEs 104 and the EPC 160. Generally, MME 162 provides bearer and connection management.

[0049] Generally, user Internet protocol (IP) packets are transferred through Serving Gateway 166, which itself is connected to PDN Gateway 172. PDN Gateway 172 provides UE IP address allocation as well as other functions. PDN Gateway 172 and the BM-SC 170 are connected to IP Services 176, which may include, for example, the Internet, an intranet, an IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), a Packet Switched (PS) streaming service, and/or other IP services.

[0050] BM-SC 170 may provide functions for MBMS user service provisioning and delivery. BM-SC 170 may serve as an entry point for content provider MBMS transmission, may be used to authorize and initiate MBMS Bearer Services within a public land mobile network (PLMN), and/or may be used to schedule MBMS transmissions. MBMS Gateway 168 may be used to distribute MBMS traffic to the BSs 102 belonging to a Multicast Broadcast Single Frequency Network (MBSFN) area broadcasting a particular service, and/or may be responsible for session management (start/stop) and for collecting eMBMS related charging information.

[0051] 5GC 190 may include various functional components, including: an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) 192, other AMFs 193, a Session Management Function (SMF) 194, and a User Plane Function (UPF) 195. AMF 192 may be in communication with Unified Data Management (UDM) 196.

[0052] AMF 192 is a control node that processes signaling between UEs 104 and 5GC 190. AMF 192 provides, for example, quality of service (QoS) flow and session management.

[0053] Internet protocol (IP) packets are transferred through UPF 195, which is connected to the IP Services 197, and which provides UE IP address allocation as well as other functions for 5GC 190. IP Services 197 may include, for example, the Internet, an intranet, an IMS, a PS streaming service, and/or other IP services.

[0054] In various aspects, a network entity or network node can be implemented as an aggregated base station, as a disaggregated base station, a component of a base station, an integrated access and backhaul (IAB) node, a relay node, a sidelink node, to name a few examples.

[0055] FIG. 2 depicts an example disaggregated base station 200 architecture. The disaggregated base station 200 architecture may include one or more central units (CUs) 210 that can communicate directly with a core network 220 via a backhaul link, or indirectly with the core network 220 through one or more disaggregated base station units (such as a Near-Real Time (Near-RT) RAN Intelligent Controller (RIC) 225 via an E2 link, or a Non-Real Time (Non-RT) RIC 215 associated with a Service Management and Orchestration (SMO) Framework 205, or both). A CU 210 may communicate with one or more distributed units (DUs) 230 via respective midhaul links, such as an Fl interface. The DUs 230 may communicate with one or more radio units (RUs) 240 via respective fronthaul links. The RUs 240 may communicate with respective UEs 104 via one or more radio frequency (RF) access links. In some implementations, the UE 104 may be simultaneously served by multiple RUs 240.

[0056] Each of the units, e.g., the CUs 210, the DUs 230, the RUs 240, as well as the Near-RT RICs 225, the Non-RT RICs 215 and the SMO Framework 205, may include one or more interfaces or be coupled to one or more interfaces configured to receive or transmit signals, data, or information (collectively, signals) via a wired or wireless transmission medium. Each of the units, or an associated processor or controller providing instructions to the communications interfaces of the units, can be configured to communicate with one or more of the other units via the transmission medium. For example, the units can include a wired interface configured to receive or transmit signals over a wired transmission medium to one or more of the other units. Additionally or alternatively, the units can include a wireless interface, which may include a receiver, a transmitter or transceiver (such as a radio frequency (RF) transceiver), configured to receive or transmit signals, or both, over a wireless transmission medium to one or more of the other units. [0057] In some aspects, the CU 210 may host one or more higher layer control functions. Such control functions can include radio resource control (RRC), packet data convergence protocol (PDCP), service data adaptation protocol (SDAP), or the like. Each control function can be implemented with an interface configured to communicate signals with other control functions hosted by the CU 210. The CU 210 may be configured to handle user plane functionality (e.g., Central Unit - User Plane (CU-UP)), control plane functionality (e.g., Central Unit - Control Plane (CU-CP)), or a combination thereof. In some implementations, the CU 210 can be logically split into one or more CU-UP units and one or more CU-CP units. The CU-UP unit can communicate bidirectionally with the CU-CP unit via an interface, such as the El interface when implemented in an O-RAN configuration. The CU 210 can be implemented to communicate with the DU 230, as necessary, for network control and signaling.

[0058] The DU 230 may correspond to a logical unit that includes one or more base station functions to control the operation of one or more RUs 240. In some aspects, the DU 230 may host one or more of a radio link control (RLC) layer, a medium access control (MAC) layer, and one or more high physical (PHY) layers (such as modules for forward error correction (FEC) encoding and decoding, scrambling, modulation and demodulation, or the like) depending, at least in part, on a functional split, such as those defined by the 3 ^rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). In some aspects, the DU 230 may further host one or more low PHY layers. Each layer (or module) can be implemented with an interface configured to communicate signals with other layers (and modules) hosted by the DU 230, or with the control functions hosted by the CU 210.

[0059] Lower-layer functionality can be implemented by one or more RUs 240. In some deployments, an RU 240, controlled by a DU 230, may correspond to a logical node that hosts RF processing functions, or low-PHY layer functions (such as performing fast Fourier transform (FFT), inverse FFT (iFFT), digital beamforming, physical random access channel (PRACH) extraction and filtering, or the like), or both, based at least in part on the functional split, such as a lower layer functional split. In such an architecture, the RU(s) 240 can be implemented to handle over the air (OTA) communications with one or more UEs 104. In some implementations, real-time and non-real-time aspects of control and user plane communications with the RU(s) 240 can be controlled by the corresponding DU 230. In some scenarios, this configuration can enable the DU(s) 230 and the CU 210 to be implemented in a cloud-based RAN architecture, such as a vRAN architecture.

[0060] The SMO Framework 205 may be configured to support RAN deployment and provisioning of non-virtualized and virtualized network elements. For non-virtualized network elements, the SMO Framework 205 may be configured to support the deployment of dedicated physical resources for RAN coverage requirements which may be managed via an operations and maintenance interface (such as an 01 interface). For virtualized network elements, the SMO Framework 205 may be configured to interact with a cloud computing platform (such as an open cloud (O-Cloud) 290) to perform network element life cycle management (such as to instantiate virtualized network elements) via a cloud computing platform interface (such as an 02 interface). Such virtualized network elements can include, but are not limited to, CUs 210, DUs 230, RUs 240 and Near-RT RICs 225. In some implementations, the SMO Framework 205 can communicate with a hardware aspect of a 4G RAN, such as an open eNB (O-eNB) 211, via an 01 interface. Additionally, in some implementations, the SMO Framework 205 can communicate directly with one or more RUs 240 via an 01 interface. The SMO Framework 205 also may include a Non-RT RIC 215 configured to support functionality of the SMO Framework 205.

[0061] The Non-RT RIC 215 may be configured to include a logical function that enables non-real-time control and optimization of RAN elements and resources, Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) workflows including model training and updates, or policy -based guidance of applications/features in the Near-RT RIC 225. The Non-RT RIC 215 may be coupled to or communicate with (such as via an Al interface) the Near-RT RIC 225. The Near-RT RIC 225 may be configured to include a logical function that enables near-real-time control and optimization of RAN elements and resources via data collection and actions over an interface (such as via an E2 interface) connecting one or more CUs 210, one or more DUs 230, or both, as well as an O-eNB, with the Near-RT RIC 225.

[0062] In some implementations, to generate AI/ML models to be deployed in the Near-RT RIC 225, the Non-RT RIC 215 may receive parameters or external enrichment information from external servers. Such information may be utilized by the Near-RT RIC 225 and may be received at the SMO Framework 205 or the Non-RT RIC 215 from nonnetwork data sources or from network functions. In some examples, the Non-RT RIC 215 or the Near-RT RIC 225 may be configured to tune RAN behavior or performance. For example, the Non-RT RIC 215 may monitor long-term trends and patterns for performance and employ AI/ML models to perform corrective actions through the SMO Framework 205 (such as reconfiguration via 01) or via creation of RAN management policies (such as Al policies).

[0063] FIG. 3 depicts aspects of an example BS 102 and a UE 104.

[0064] Generally, BS 102 includes various processors (e.g., 320, 330, 338, and 340), antennas 334a-t (collectively 334), transceivers 332a-t (collectively 332), which include modulators and demodulators, and other aspects, which enable wireless transmission of data (e.g., data source 312) and wireless reception of data (e.g., data sink 339). For example, BS 102 may send and receive data between BS 102 and UE 104. BS 102 includes controller/processor 340, which may be configured to implement various functions described herein related to wireless communications.

[0065] Generally, UE 104 includes various processors (e.g., 358, 364, 366, and 380), antennas 352a-r (collectively 352), transceivers 354a-r (collectively 354), which include modulators and demodulators, and other aspects, which enable wireless transmission of data (e.g., retrieved from data source 362) and wireless reception of data (e.g., provided to data sink 360). UE 104 includes controller/processor 380, which may be configured to implement various functions described herein related to wireless communications.

[0066] In regards to an example downlink transmission, BS 102 includes a transmit processor 320 that may receive data from a data source 312 and control information from a controller/processor 340. The control information may be for the physical broadcast channel (PBCH), physical control format indicator channel (PCFICH), physical HARQ indicator channel (PHICH), physical downlink control channel (PDCCH), group common PDCCH (GC PDCCH), and/or others. The data may be for the physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH), in some examples.

[0067] Transmit processor 320 may process (e.g., encode and symbol map) the data and control information to obtain data symbols and control symbols, respectively. Transmit processor 320 may also generate reference symbols, such as for the primary synchronization signal (PSS), secondary synchronization signal (SSS), PBCH demodulation reference signal (DMRS), and channel state information reference signal (CSI-RS). [0068] Transmit (TX) multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) processor 330 may perform spatial processing (e.g., precoding) on the data symbols, the control symbols, and/or the reference symbols, if applicable, and may provide output symbol streams to the modulators (MODs) in transceivers 332a-332t. Each modulator in transceivers 332a- 332t may process a respective output symbol stream to obtain an output sample stream. Each modulator may further process (e.g., convert to analog, amplify, filter, and upconvert) the output sample stream to obtain a downlink signal. Downlink signals from the modulators in transceivers 332a-332t may be transmitted via the antennas 334a-334t, respectively.

[0069] In order to receive the downlink transmission, UE 104 includes antennas 352a- 352r that may receive the downlink signals from the BS 102 and may provide received signals to the demodulators (DEMODs) in transceivers 354a-354r, respectively. Each demodulator in transceivers 354a-354r may condition (e.g., filter, amplify, downconvert, and digitize) a respective received signal to obtain input samples. Each demodulator may further process the input samples to obtain received symbols.

[0070] MIMO detector 356 may obtain received symbols from all the demodulators in transceivers 354a-354r, perform MIMO detection on the received symbols if applicable, and provide detected symbols. Receive processor 358 may process (e.g., demodulate, deinterleave, and decode) the detected symbols, provide decoded data for the UE 104 to a data sink 360, and provide decoded control information to a controller/processor 380.

[0071] In regards to an example uplink transmission, UE 104 further includes a transmit processor 364 that may receive and process data (e.g., for the PUSCH) from a data source 362 and control information (e.g., for the physical uplink control channel (PUCCH)) from the controller/processor 380. Transmit processor 364 may also generate reference symbols for a reference signal (e.g., for the sounding reference signal (SRS)). The symbols from the transmit processor 364 may be precoded by a TX MIMO processor 366 if applicable, further processed by the modulators in transceivers 354a-354r (e.g., for SC-FDM), and transmitted to BS 102.

[0072] At BS 102, the uplink signals from UE 104 may be received by antennas 334a- t, processed by the demodulators in transceivers 332a-332t, detected by a MIMO detector 336 if applicable, and further processed by a receive processor 338 to obtain decoded data and control information sent by UE 104. Receive processor 338 may provide the decoded data to a data sink 339 and the decoded control information to the controller/processor 340.

[0073] Memories 342 and 382 may store data and program codes for BS 102 and UE 104, respectively.

[0074] Scheduler 344 may schedule UEs for data transmission on the downlink and/or uplink.

[0075] In various aspects, BS 102 may be described as transmitting and receiving various types of data associated with the methods described herein. In these contexts, “transmitting” may refer to various mechanisms of outputting data, such as outputting data from data source 312, scheduler 344, memory 342, transmit processor 320, controller/processor 340, TX MIMO processor 330, transceivers 332a-t, antenna 334a-t, and/or other aspects described herein. Similarly, “receiving” may refer to various mechanisms of obtaining data, such as obtaining data from antennas 334a-t, transceivers 332a-t, RX MIMO detector 336, controller/processor 340, receive processor 338, scheduler 344, memory 342, and/or other aspects described herein.

[0076] In various aspects, UE 104 may likewise be described as transmitting and receiving various types of data associated with the methods described herein. In these contexts, “transmitting” may refer to various mechanisms of outputting data, such as outputting data from data source 362, memory 382, transmit processor 364, controller/processor 380, TX MIMO processor 366, transceivers 354a-t, antenna 352a-t, and/or other aspects described herein. Similarly, “receiving” may refer to various mechanisms of obtaining data, such as obtaining data from antennas 352a-t, transceivers 354a-t, RX MIMO detector 356, controller/processor 380, receive processor 358, memory 382, and/or other aspects described herein.

[0077] In some aspects, a processor may be configured to perform various operations, such as those associated with the methods described herein, and transmit (output) to or receive (obtain) data from another interface that is configured to transmit or receive, respectively, the data.

[0078] FIGS. 4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D depict aspects of data structures for a wireless communications network, such as wireless communications network 100 of FIG. 1. [0079] In particular, FIG. 4A is a diagram 400 illustrating an example of a first subframe within a 5G (e.g., 5GNR) frame structure, FIG. 4B is a diagram 430 illustrating an example of DL channels within a 5G subframe, FIG. 4C is a diagram 450 illustrating an example of a second subframe within a 5G frame structure, and FIG. 4D is a diagram 480 illustrating an example of UL channels within a 5G subframe.

[0080] Wireless communications systems may utilize orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) with a cyclic prefix (CP) on the uplink and downlink. Such systems may also support half-duplex operation using time division duplexing (TDD). OFDM and single-carrier frequency division multiplexing (SC-FDM) partition the system bandwidth (e.g., as depicted in FIGS. 4B and 4D) into multiple orthogonal subcarriers. Each subcarrier may be modulated with data. Modulation symbols may be sent in the frequency domain with OFDM and/or in the time domain with SC-FDM.

[0081] A wireless communications frame structure may be frequency division duplex (FDD), in which, for a particular set of subcarriers, subframes within the set of subcarriers are dedicated for either DL or UL. Wireless communications frame structures may also be time division duplex (TDD), in which, for a particular set of subcarriers, subframes within the set of subcarriers are dedicated for both DL and UL.

[0082] In FIG. 4A and 4C, the wireless communications frame structure is TDD where D is DL, U is UL, and X is flexible for use between DL/UL. UEs may be configured with a slot format through a received slot format indicator (SFI) (dynamically through DL control information (DCI), or semi-statically/statically through radio resource control (RRC) signaling). In the depicted examples, a 10 ms frame is divided into 10 equally sized 1 ms subframes. Each subframe may include one or more time slots. In some examples, each slot may include 7 or 14 symbols, depending on the slot format. Subframes may also include mini-slots, which generally have fewer symbols than an entire slot. Other wireless communications technologies may have a different frame structure and/or different channels.

[0083] In certain aspects, the number of slots within a subframe is based on a slot configuration and a numerology. For example, for slot configuration 0, different numerol ogies (p) 0 to 5 allow for 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, and 32 slots, respectively, per subframe. For slot configuration 1, different numerol ogies 0 to 2 allow for 2, 4, and 8 slots, respectively, per subframe. Accordingly, for slot configuration 0 and numerology p, there are 14 symbols/slot and 2p slots/subframe. The subcarrier spacing and symbol length/duration are a function of the numerology. The subcarrier spacing may be equal to 2^ X 15 kHz, where p is the numerology 0 to 5. As such, the numerology p = 0 has a subcarrier spacing of 15 kHz and the numerology p = 5 has a subcarrier spacing of 480 kHz. The symbol length/duration is inversely related to the subcarrier spacing. FIGS. 4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D provide an example of slot configuration 0 with 14 symbols per slot and numerology p = 2 with 4 slots per subframe. The slot duration is 0.25 ms, the subcarrier spacing is 60 kHz, and the symbol duration is approximately 16.67 ps.

[0084] As depicted in FIGS. 4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D, a resource grid may be used to represent the frame structure. Each time slot includes a resource block (RB) (also referred to as physical RBs (PRBs)) that extends, for example, 12 consecutive subcarriers. The resource grid is divided into multiple resource elements (REs). The number of bits carried by each RE depends on the modulation scheme.

[0085] As illustrated in FIG. 4A, some of the REs carry reference (pilot) signals (RS) for a UE (e.g., UE 104 of FIGS. 1 and 3). The RS may include demodulation RS (DMRS) and/or channel state information reference signals (CSI-RS) for channel estimation at the UE. The RS may also include beam measurement RS (BRS), beam refinement RS (BRRS), and/or phase tracking RS (PT-RS).

[0086] FIG. 4B illustrates an example of various DL channels within a subframe of a frame. The physical downlink control channel (PDCCH) carries DCI within one or more control channel elements (CCEs), each CCE including, for example, nine RE groups (REGs), each REG including, for example, four consecutive REs in an OFDM symbol.

[0087] A primary synchronization signal (PSS) may be within symbol 2 of particular subframes of a frame. The PSS is used by a UE (e.g., 104 of FIGS. 1 and 3) to determine subframe/symbol timing and a physical layer identity.

[0088] A secondary synchronization signal (SSS) may be within symbol 4 of particular subframes of a frame. The SSS is used by a UE to determine a physical layer cell identity group number and radio frame timing.

[0089] Based on the physical layer identity and the physical layer cell identity group number, the UE can determine a physical cell identifier (PCI). Based on the PCI, the UE can determine the locations of the aforementioned DMRS. The physical broadcast channel (PBCH), which carries a master information block (MIB), may be logically grouped with the PSS and SSS to form a synchronization signal (SS)/PBCH block. The MIB provides a number of RBs in the system bandwidth and a system frame number (SFN). The physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH) carries user data, broadcast system information not transmitted through the PBCH such as system information blocks (SIBs), and/or paging messages.

[0090] As illustrated in FIG. 4C, some of the REs carry DMRS (indicated as R for one particular configuration, but other DMRS configurations are possible) for channel estimation at the base station. The UE may transmit DMRS for the PUCCH and DMRS for the PUSCH. The PUSCH DMRS may be transmitted, for example, in the first one or two symbols of the PUSCH. The PUCCH DMRS may be transmitted in different configurations depending on whether short or long PUCCHs are transmitted and depending on the particular PUCCH format used. UE 104 may transmit sounding reference signals (SRS). The SRS may be transmitted, for example, in the last symbol of a subframe. The SRS may have a comb structure, and a UE may transmit SRS on one of the combs. The SRS may be used by a base station for channel quality estimation to enable frequency-dependent scheduling on the UL.

[0091] FIG. 4D illustrates an example of various UL channels within a subframe of a frame. The PUCCH may be located as indicated in one configuration. The PUCCH carries uplink control information (UCI), such as scheduling requests, a channel quality indicator (CQI), a precoding matrix indicator (PMI), a rank indicator (RI), and HARQ ACK/NACK feedback. The PUSCH carries data, and may additionally be used to carry a buffer status report (BSR), a power headroom report (PHR), and/or UCI.

Overview of Need for Secure Wireless Transmission Mechanisms

[0092] Aspects of the present disclosure provide mechanisms that may help enhance security of wireless communications.

[0093] As noted above, secure communications are very important in many wireless communications systems. Given the level of importance of data obtained from devices is these systems, adding more security to wireless transmissions may be desirable to avoid attacks, particularly on channels that are currently unprotected (transmitted without security). As illustrated in FIG. 5, such attacks may have severe impact on system performance, for example, leading to throughput degradation or out of synchronization (OO S) events. [0094] The techniques proposed herein may help improve security by using a secret key or adding a signature to wireless transmissions generated using a probabilistic shaper. This may be particularly beneficial to secure certain NR channels, such as PDCCH and PUCCH, that lack L3 security. The techniques may also help add a new layer of security to the physical layer (LI PHY), which may be particularly beneficial for advanced systems (e.g., NR Release 18, Release 19 and beyond). In such systems, energy transfer may be used, where a transmitting node can send an RF power signal to power a passive loT device.

[0095] The secret key and/or signature may allow a wireless transmission to be successfully received at an intended (legitimate) receiver, but not at an unintended receiver (an eavesdropper). The techniques may be applied in the scenario shown in FIG. 6, for example, to increase security of transmissions between a network entity (e.g., a gNB) and a first UE (UE 1), where a second UE (UE 2) may be considered a potential eavesdropper.

[0096] One mechanism to protect such transmissions could involve a first step, of sharing a secret key between legitimate terminals (e.g., the gNB and UE 1 in the example of FIG. 6). The secret keys may be obtained and/or exchanged using various mechanisms. For example, secret keys could be obtained from upper layer techniques, for example, using a Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm that is a form of a key-exchange protocol which relies on using a Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm or other mechanisms to share keys that rely on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), or PHY layer using channel reciprocity and randomness.

Overview of Probabilistic Shaping

[0097] In existing wireless communication standards (e.g., cellular and WiFi), higher-order modulation (e.g., 16-QAM, 64-QAM, or 256-QAM) are used to increase the spectral efficiency at higher SNR values.

[0098] For example, FIG. 7 is a block diagram of a typical QAM-based transmission processing flow. As illustrated, an information payload (e.g., K information bits) may be encoded, with channel coding to generate a set of coded bits. The actual bit stream after channel encoding may not be uniformly distributed. As such, a scrambling technique may be used to scramble the coded bits after the encoder with some uniform random bits. Uniform distributed bits implies that the modulation symbols after modulation are uniformly distributed over the constellation set.

[0099] In conventional systems, the constellations are fixed (typically square constellations as with the 16-QAM constellation shown in FIG. 8), and each constellation point is used with equal probability.

[0100] As noted above, probabilistic shaping generally refers to a technique to generate non-uniformly distributed coded modulation symbols and is typically used to improve the spectral efficiency of the coded modulation. The main goal of probabilistic shaping is typically to generate non-uniformly distributed constellations. This can achieve larger mutual information than conventional uniformly distributed constellations at the same SNR. Examples of probabilistic shaping include probabilistic amplitude shaping (PAS), which shapes the amplitude of the constellation, but leaves the sign of the constellation uniformly distributed. Probabilistic shaping is also known as distribution matching (DM).

[0101] FIG. 9 illustrates an example transmitter processing flow including a probabilistic shaper that precedes forward error correction (FEC) coding.

[0102] As illustrated, a portion of information payload (I/P) bits is received by the probabilistic shaper, which generates non-uniform bits. A portion of the I/P bits may bypass the probabilistic shaper as uniform bits. The FEC encoder may take the non- uniform bits and uniform bits and generate shaped systematic bits, unshaped systematic bits, and parity bits. These bits are mapped to quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbols by an amplitude mapping component and sign mapping component. Resulting QAM symbols are then transmitted over the wireless medium to a wireless receiver.

[0103] At the wireless receiver, complementary processing may be performed (in reverse order). The wireless receiver may receive the shaped symbols from the transmitter and perform physical layer processing to recover a sequence of bits corresponding to the original information payload (I/P).

Aspects related to PHY Layer Security for Probabilistic Coding Schemes

[0104] Aspects of the present disclosure provide mechanisms that may help enhance security of wireless communications in systems that utilize probabilistic shapers. [0105] For example, as illustrated in FIG. 10A, a transmitter may providing security for transmission of a sequence of shaped symbols using at least one code during the physical layer processing. A receiver, having knowledge of the at least one code, can process the received shaped symbols to recover the I/P bits.

[0106] As illustrated in FIG. 10A, the transmitter may perform the physical layer processing (described above with reference to FIG. 8) to generate a sequence of shaped symbols from a sequence of information bits (information payload I/P) using a probabilistic shaper function.

[0107] As illustrated in FIG. 10A, the at least one code may be a secret key (SK) used to alter some of the physical layer processing at the transmitter to provide PHY layer security. The SK may be determined, for example, by upper layers, indicated by layer 2 or layer 3, L2/L3 (secured channels), or extracted from PHY channel.

[0108] FIG. 10A illustrates example various options for how an SK may be used to provide security during PHY layer processing. In the figure, options are indicated as SK(x) for option x. The table in FIG. 10B summarizes how the SK is used in the various options shown in FIG. 10A (e.g., Option 1 in the table corresponds to SK(1) in FIG. 10A). In some cases, a combination of the options may be used to (further) enhance security. Which option (or combination of options) is used may depend, for example, on implementation considerations, such as complexity or performance.

[0109] In some cases, a logical operation, such as an XOR operation or an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm may be performed on some of the bits in the processing flow using the SK. The AES algorithm, for example, may be an algorithm based on a Rijndael block cipher adopted by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) or another Rijndael block cipher that includes a series of one or more additions (e.g., using bitwise XOR), non-linear substitutions, transpositions, and linear mixings.

[0110] According to a first option (Optionl), an XOR operation or AES algorithm may be performed with information bits (I/P) and the SK. In some cases, uniform and non-uniform bits may be associated with different Quality of Service (QoS), priority, and/or reliability, so security (and/or privacy) may also be assigned to specific bits (uniform vs non-uniform). [0111] According to a second option (Option 2), the SK may be used to select the non-uniform and uniform bits (e.g., which go to the probabilistic shaper and which bypass). According to a third option (Option 3), the SK may be used to select a probabilistic shaper to use, from a set of available probabilistic shapers.

[0112] According to a fourth option (Option 4), an XOR operation or AES algorithm may be performed with the SK and non-uniform bits before the (high rate systematic) FEC. According to a fifth option (Option 5), an XOR operation or AES algorithm may be performed with the SK and uniform bits before the FEC.

[0113] According to a sixth option (Option 6), an XOR operation or AES algorithm may be performed with the SK and shaped systematic bits after the FEC. According to a seventh option (Option 7), an XOR operation or AES algorithm may be performed with the SK and unshaped systematic bits after the FEC. According to an eighth option (Option 8), an XOR operation or AES algorithm may be performed with the SK and parity bits after the FEC.

[0114] Various other options (not illustrated in FIGs. 10A and 10B) for using an SK to provide security are also available. For example, according to one option, the amplitude, or mapping function to amplitude, can be manipulated (e.g., encrypted) using the SK. According to another option, the sign, or mapping function to sign, may be manipulated by the SK. According to another option, the QAM constellation points may be encrypted using the SK.

[0115] In some cases, a code used to provide security may be a signature generated using a signature maker function. The signature may be added to authenticate the wireless communication from the transmitter, effectively informing the intended receiver that the transmission was legitimate.

[0116] The signature may be generated based on an ID configured by a base station, transmitter or some other network entity (e.g.., using L2/L3 as input to the signature maker function).

[0117] As illustrated in FIG. 11 A, in some cases, the signature may be generated based on an SK. For example, the SK may be extracted from an upper layer, and/or signaled by a base station, transmitter or some other network entity. As illustrated in FIG. 11B, a receiver using the same SK may be able to verify the communication, based on the I/P recovered from the received shaped symbols. [0118] As illustrated, the information payload (I/P) may be used as input to the signature maker (and verifier). In some cases, the I/P used as input to the signature maker may be before FEC (e.g. non-uniform bits, uniform bits, or a combination thereof). In other cases, the I/P used as input to the signature maker may be after FEC (e.g., shaped systematic bits, unshaped systematic bits, parity bits, or a combination thereof).

[0119] There are also various options for where to add the signature in the transmission processing flow. In some cases, a combination of the options described below may be used to (further) enhance security.

[0120] The table in FIG. 11C summarizes various options for a signature, including different types of bits the signature may be based on and different options for where/how signature bits may be added. As illustrated, the signature may be based on (or added as) at least one of uniform bits, non-uniform bits, or parity bits, before FEC or after FEC, after mapping to amplitude and sign, a timestamp (e.g., a system frame number-SFN, slot, subslot, sym, or other representation of time), or one or more configured IDs.

[0121] As illustrated in FIG. 12, according to a first option, the signature can be encoded (added before FEC). In some cases, the signature may be encoded with a different encoder or taken as input to signature bits as uniform and non-uniform bits. After encoding, the signature may be mapped to shaped, unshaped, and parity bits. According to a second option, signature bits can be mapped (without encoding using the High rate Systematic FEC) to shaped, unshaped, parity bits.

[0122] As illustrated in FIG. 13, according to a third option, signature bits can be added as a new set of bits after FEC (as is or after encoding with a different encoder or after modifications) and mapped to either amplitude, sign, or both (e.g., divided into parts).

[0123] In some cases, an asymmetric key may be used for authentication described herein (e.g., as the SK described above). For example, an asymmetric key generation may be used for a signature. In this case, the transmitter may generate two SKs: a private key e and a public key d (e.g., designed such that a product of e and d is 1). The transmitter may then share the public key (e.g., with all in the network, such that potential attackers can know about them).

[0124] A transmitted message m may be hashed to H(m). The transmitter may send m and send H(m) ^A e, using private key e. The receiver may then determine m and can compute H(/7?)=H(/77 ( received. The receiver received H(m) ^A e, so it can use H(m) ^A {et/} to obtain H(/7?)=H(/7? ( obtained. If H(/7? ( obtained is equal to received H(m), then the receiver can consider the message coming from the transmitter is legitimate. This may provide robust security because, the public and private keys d and e may be chosen such that, given d, an attacker would need several years to know e.

[0125] In some cases, a signature used for authentication may be determined according to a commitment scheme. A commitment scheme generally refers to scheme that allows a user to commit to a chosen value, while keeping it hidden to others, but with the ability to reveal the chosen value later. It is referred to as a committed value, because a user is not to change the value after committing to it.

[0126] One example of a commitment scheme is referred to as a Leveraging Pederson

Commitment (LPC), that is based on the hardness of discrete log problems, unconditionally hiding, and computationally binding.

[0127] An LPC based algorithm may be described as follows. In a precondition step, public parameters (/?, g, h) may be shared with UEs (e.g., via L1/L2/L3 signaling, where L3 may be used to provide added security). The parameter p may be a large prime number, g may be a number in the range of [2, p-1], while h may be an element in [2, p- 1] such that loggh is unknown.

[0128] The network may provide ^°h ^r mod p as a commitment of bits to a probabilistic amplitude shaping (PAS) scheme, where the ID may be given by a network entity (e.g., a gNB or a SL UE) as a scrambling ID, for example, using L2/L3 signaling. In some cases, a combination of such an ID may be used with a timestamp, some set of bits, or a combination thereof. For example, the set of bits may be one or more of the different types of bits referenced in FIGs. 10B and 11C. In the product ^°h ^r , r is a random number. As illustrated in FIG. 14A, in this case, the signature may include some combination of I/P and r.

[0129] The commitment of bits of a PAS scheme (e.g., which can be used for PDSCH/PSSCH/PDCCH/SCI/DCI data transmission) may be provided to the UE using L1/L2/L3 (e.g., where L3 may be used due to security). The network may broadcast r and send the I/P (as shaped symbols). In this case, r may transmitted together with the corresponding channel bits transmission (this can for data or control channel with channel coding as PAS). The UE may then verify the committed value after receiving the channel and r.

[0130] Another example of a commitment scheme is referred to as a Leveraging Zero- Knowledge Proof (ZKP), which may also be based on the hardness of discrete log problems, unconditionally hiding, and computationally binding. ZKP may be based on Pederson commitment and Fiat-Shamir scheme. In this case, the secret may not be shared with UEs.

[0131] A ZKP based algorithm may be described as follows. The network may have a private key x and a public value y = g' ^: mod p. The network may pick a random value v and compute a value t=g ^v . The network may also compute c=H(g, , /, ID), where H() is a cryptographic hash function. The network may compute c using the following IDs: an ID given by a NW unit (gNB, SL UE) scrambling ID or a combination of such an ID with a timestamp, PAS bits, or combination thereof. The network may also compute r=v-cx. The proof is the pair (/,/'); (g ^v , v-cx).

[0132] As illustrated in FIG. 14B, in this case, the signature may include some combination of I/P and a pair of {t, r}. The UE may calculate c= H(g, y, t, ID) and check whether t = g ^r g ^xc = g ^v .

[0133] Another example of a commitment scheme is referred to as a Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) commitment scheme, a broadcast authentication mechanism.

[0134] The TESLA scheme may be considered similar to a hash/MAC commitment scheme. Using reverse hash chain, the network may create a hash chain of keys by repeated hash of a root key Ki+i = Hash (Ki), where 1 <= I <= n. The network may disclose the hash values (keys) in the reverse order of the calculation: K(t=0) = Kn, K(t=l) = Kn-i, ..., K(t=n-1) = Ki. The key may be disclosed later and verified using the previously disclosed key: Previous Key K(t=i-1) = Hash (K(t=i)), i.e., Kn-i+i = Hash (Kn-i).

[0135] The first key value may need to be authenticated by the network. For example, during the registration or access stratum (AS) security setup. The TESLA scheme may be useful for a continuous stream. The reverse order of the calculation may be described as follows. Assuming 2 keys, one for uniform bits, and one for non-uniform bits, keys may be assigned in reverse order: Uniform -> Ki+1; and Non-uniform -> Ki. [0136] In this case, uniform bits may be transmitted first and then non-uniform bits, but it may have the hash key that is later in the hash chain of keys. In general, the uniform bits may have a key that is derived based on a hash chain of keys such that the uniform bits are later compared to the non-uniform bits. In this description, uniform bits may refer to uniform bits before encoding, uniform bits after encoding, or a combination thereof. Similarly, non-uniform bits may refer to non-uniform bits after encoding, non-uniform bits after encoding, or a combination thereof.

[0137] In some cases, it may be possible to switch between one or more of the various options presented herein (e.g., including the various options summarized in FIGs. 10B and 11C). In such cases, such a switch may be indicated via one or more of LI, L2, or L3 signaling.

Example Operations of a Transmitter

[0138] FIG. 15 shows an example of a method 1500 for wireless communications by a transmitter. In some aspects, the transmitter is a UE, such as a UE 104 of FIGS. 1 and 3. In some aspects, the transmitter is a network entity, such as a BS 102 of FIGS. 1 and 3, or a disaggregated base station as discussed with respect to FIG. 2.

[0139] Method 1500 begins at step 1505 with obtaining a sequence of information bits. In some cases, the operations of this step refer to, or may be performed by, circuitry for obtaining and/or code for obtaining as described with reference to FIG. 17.

[0140] Method 1500 then proceeds to step 1510 with performing physical layer processing to generate a sequence of shaped symbols from the sequence of information bits using a probabilistic shaper function. In some cases, the operations of this step refer to, or may be performed by, circuitry for performing and/or code for performing as described with reference to FIG. 17.

[0141] Method 1500 then proceeds to step 1515 with providing security for transmission of the sequence of shaped symbols using at least one code during the physical layer processing. In some cases, the operations of this step refer to, or may be performed by, circuitry for providing and/or code for providing as described with reference to FIG. 17.

[0142] Method 1500 then proceeds to step 1520 with transmitting the sequence of shaped symbols to a receiver. In some cases, the operations of this step refer to, or may be performed by, circuitry for transmitting and/or code for transmitting as described with reference to FIG. 17.

[0143] In some aspects, the at least one code comprises at least one key.

[0144] In some aspects, providing the security comprises encoding a set of bits using the key.

[0145] In some aspects, the set of bits comprise at least one of: the sequence of information bits; non-uniform bits generated by the probabilistic shaper function; or uniform bits that bypass the probabilistic shaper function.

[0146] In some aspects, the set of bits comprise at least one of: shaped systematic bits after a FEC function; unshaped systematic bits after the FEC function; or parity bits after the FEC function.

[0147] In some aspects, providing the security comprises selecting, based on the key, which bits of the sequence of information bits to use to generate the non-uniform bits and which bits of the sequence of information bits bypass the probabilistic shaper function.

[0148] In some aspects, providing the security comprises selecting, based on the key, the probabilistic shaper function from a plurality of available probabilistic shaper functions.

[0149] In some aspects, the shaped symbols correspond to points on a QAM constellation; and performing the physical layer processing involves a first mapping function to map shaped systematic bits to amplitudes and a second mapping function to map unshaped systematic bits to signs.

[0150] In some aspects, providing the security comprises at least one of: altering at least one of the first mapping function or a corresponding amplitude, based on the key; altering at least one of the second mapping function or a corresponding sign, based on the key; or encoding the constellation points, based on the key.

[0151] In some aspects, the code comprises a signature generated using a signature maker function.

[0152] In some aspects, the signature is generated using a signature maker function based on at least one of a configured ID or a key. [0153] In some aspects, the signature is generated using, as input, at least one of: non- uniform bits generated by the probabilistic shaper function; or uniform bits that bypass the probabilistic shaper function.

[0154] In some aspects, the signature is generated using, as input, at least one of: shaped systematic bits after a FEC function; unshaped systematic bits after the FEC function; or parity bits after the FEC function.

[0155] In some aspects, the signature is mapped to at least one of shaped bits, unshaped bits, or parity bits.

[0156] In some aspects, the signature is encoded with a FEC function before mapping to the at least one of shaped bits, unshaped bits, or parity bits.

[0157] In some aspects, the signature is added as a set of bits after a FEC function and mapped to at least one of an amplitude or sign.

[0158] In some aspects, performing the physical layer processing involves a first function to convert shaped systematic bits to amplitudes and a second function to convert unshaped systematic bits and parity bits into phases; and the signature is generated based on at least one of output of the first function or output of the second function.

[0159] In some aspects, the signature is determined according to a commitment scheme.

[0160] In some aspects, the signature is determined based on a commitment of bits to the probabilistic shaper function.

[0161] In some aspects, the commitment of bits to the probabilistic shaper function is determined based on at least one of a provided ID or network broadcast parameter.

[0162] In some aspects, the signature is also determined based on at least one of a timestamp or shaped bits.

[0163] In some aspects, the signature is determined using a hash chain of keys, including: a first key is assigned for uniform bits; and a second key assigned for non- uniform bits generated by the probabilistic shaper function.

[0164] In some aspects, the first and second keys are indicated by a network entity in reverse order of calculation. [0165] In one aspect, method 1500, or any aspect related to it, may be performed by an apparatus, such as communications device 1700 of FIG. 17, which includes various components operable, configured, or adapted to perform the method 1500. Communications device 1700 is described below in further detail.

[0166] Note that FIG. 15 is just one example of a method, and other methods including fewer, additional, or alternative steps are possible consistent with this disclosure.

Example Operations of a Receiver

[0167] FIG. 16 shows an example of a method 1600 for wireless communications by a receiver. In some aspects, the receiver is a UE, such as a UE 104 of FIGS. 1 and 3. In some aspects, the receiver is a network entity, such as a BS 102 of FIGS. 1 and 3, or a disaggregated base station as discussed with respect to FIG. 2.

[0168] Method 1600 begins at step 1605 with receiving a sequence of shaped symbols from a transmitter. In some cases, the operations of this step refer to, or may be performed by, circuitry for receiving and/or code for receiving as described with reference to FIG. 18

[0169] Method 1600 then proceeds to step 1610 with obtaining at least one code used to provide security for the sequence of shaped symbols. In some cases, the operations of this step refer to, or may be performed by, circuitry for obtaining and/or code for obtaining as described with reference to FIG. 18.

[0170] Method 1600 then proceeds to step 1615 with performing physical layer processing to recover a sequence of information bits from the sequence of shaped symbols, using a probabilistic deshaper function and the at least one code. In some cases, the operations of this step refer to, or may be performed by, circuitry for performing and/or code for performing as described with reference to FIG. 18.

[0171] In some aspects, the at least one code comprises at least one key.

[0172] In some aspects, performing physical layer processing to recover a sequence of information bits comprises decoding a set of bits using the key. [0173] In some aspects, the set of bits comprise at least one of: the sequence of information bits; non-uniform bits generated by the probabilistic shaper function; or uniform bits that bypass the probabilistic shaper function.

[0174] In some aspects, the set of bits comprise at least one of: shaped systematic bits after a FEC function; unshaped systematic bits after the FEC function; or parity bits after the FEC function.

[0175] In some aspects, performing physical layer processing comprises determining, based on the key, which bits of the sequence of information bits were used to generate non-uniform bits and which bits of the sequence of information bits can bypass the probabilistic deshaper function.

[0176] In some aspects, performing physical layer processing comprises determining, based on the key, the probabilistic deshaper function from a plurality of available probabilistic deshaper functions.

[0177] In some aspects, the shaped symbols correspond to points on a QAM constellation; and performing the physical layer processing involves a first demapping function to demap amplitudes to shaped systematic bits and a second demapping function to map signs to unshaped systematic bits.

[0178] In some aspects, performing the physical layer processing involves at least one of: determining at least one of the first demapping function or a corresponding amplitude, based on the key; determining at least one of the second demapping function or a corresponding sign, based on the key; or decoding the constellation points, based on the key.

[0179] In some aspects, the code comprises a signature generated using a signature maker function.

[0180] In some aspects, the signature is generated using a signature maker function based on at least one of a configured ID or a key.

[0181] In some aspects, the signature is generated using, as input, at least one of nonuniform bits or uniform bits. [0182] In some aspects, the signature is generated using, as input, at least one of shaped systematic bits, unshaped systematic bits after the FEC function, or parity bits after the FEC function.

[0183] In some aspects, the signature is mapped to at least one of shaped bits, unshaped bits, or parity bits.

[0184] In some aspects, the signature is decoded after demapping at least one of shaped bits, unshaped bits, or parity bits.

[0185] In some aspects, the signature is obtained as a set of bits before a FEC function and demapped from at least one of an amplitude or sign.

[0186] In some aspects, performing the physical layer processing involves a first function to convert amplitudes to shaped systematic bits and a second function to convert phases to unshaped systematic bits and parity bits; and the signature is obtained based on at least one of input of the first function or input of the second function.

[0187] In some aspects, the signature is determined according to a commitment scheme.

[0188] In some aspects, the signature is determined based on a commitment of bits to the probabilistic deshaper function.

[0189] In some aspects, the commitment of bits to the probabilistic deshaper function is determined based on at least one of a provided ID or network broadcast parameter.

[0190] In some aspects, the signature is also determined based on at least one of a timestamp or shaped bits.

[0191] In some aspects, the signature is determined using a hash chain of keys, including: a first key is assigned for uniform bits; and a second key assigned for non- uniform bits generated by the probabilistic deshaper function.

[0192] In some aspects, the first and second keys are indicated by a network entity in reverse order of calculation.

[0193] In one aspect, method 1600, or any aspect related to it, may be performed by an apparatus, such as communications device 1800 of FIG. 18, which includes various components operable, configured, or adapted to perform the method 1600. Communications device 1800 is described below in further detail.

[0194] Note that FIG. 16 is just one example of a method, and other methods including fewer, additional, or alternative steps are possible consistent with this disclosure.

Example Communications Devices

[0195] FIG. 17 depicts aspects of an example communications device 1700. In some aspects, communications device 1700 is a user equipment, such as a UE 104 described above with respect to FIGS. 1 and 3. In some aspects, communications device 1700 is a network entity, such as a BS 102 of FIGS. 1 and 3, or a disaggregated base station as discussed with respect to FIG. 2.

[0196] The communications device 1700 includes a processing system 1705 coupled to the transceiver 1765 (e.g., a transmitter and/or a receiver). In some aspects (e.g., when communications device 1700 is a network entity), processing system 1705 may be coupled to a network interface 1775 that is configured to obtain and send signals for the communications device 1700 via communication link(s), such as a backhaul link, midhaul link, and/or fronthaul link as described herein, such as with respect to FIG. 2. The transceiver 1765 is configured to transmit and receive signals for the communications device 1700 via the antenna 1770, such as the various signals as described herein. The processing system 1705 may be configured to perform processing functions for the communications device 1700, including processing signals received and/or to be transmitted by the communications device 1700.

[0197] The processing system 1705 includes one or more processors 1710. In various aspects, the one or more processors 1710 may be representative of one or more of receive processor 358, transmit processor 364, TX MIMO processor 366, and/or controller/processor 380, as described with respect to FIG. 3. In various aspects, one or more processors 1710 may be representative of one or more of receive processor 338, transmit processor 320, TX MIMO processor 330, and/or controller/processor 340, as described with respect to FIG. 3. The one or more processors 1710 are coupled to a computer-readable medium/memory 1735 via a bus 1760. In certain aspects, the computer-readable medium/memory 1735 is configured to store instructions (e.g., computer-executable code) that when executed by the one or more processors 1710, cause the one or more processors 1710 to perform the method 1500 described with respect to FIG. 15, or any aspect related to it. Note that reference to a processor performing a function of communications device 1700 may include one or more processors 1710 performing that function of communications device 1700.

[0198] In the depicted example, computer-readable medium/memory 1735 stores code (e.g., executable instructions), such as code for obtaining 1740, code for performing 1745, code for providing 1750, and code for transmitting 1755. Processing of the code for obtaining 1740, code for performing 1745, code for providing 1750, and code for transmitting 1755 may cause the communications device 1700 to perform the method 1500 described with respect to FIG. 15, or any aspect related to it.

[0199] The one or more processors 1710 include circuitry configured to implement (e.g., execute) the code stored in the computer-readable medium/memory 1735, including circuitry such as circuitry for obtaining 1715, circuitry for performing 1720, circuitry for providing 1725, and circuitry for transmitting 1730. Processing with circuitry for obtaining 1715, circuitry for performing 1720, circuitry for providing 1725, and circuitry for transmitting 1730 may cause the communications device 1700 to perform the method 1500 described with respect to FIG. 15, or any aspect related to it.

[0200] Various components of the communications device 1700 may provide means for performing the method 1500 described with respect to FIG. 15, or any aspect related to it. For example, means for transmitting, sending or outputting for transmission may include transceivers 354 and/or antenna(s) 352 of the UE 104 illustrated in FIG. 3, transceivers 332 and/or antenna(s) 334 of the BS 102 illustrated in FIG. 3, and/or the transceiver 1765 and the antenna 1770 of the communications device 1700 in FIG. 17. Means for receiving or obtaining may include transceivers 354 and/or antenna(s) 352 of the UE 104 illustrated in FIG. 3, transceivers 332 and/or antenna(s) 334 of the BS 102 illustrated in FIG. 3, and/or the transceiver 1765 and the antenna 1770 of the communications device 1700 in FIG. 17.

[0201] FIG. 18 depicts aspects of an example communications device 1800. In some aspects, communications device 1800 is a user equipment, such as a UE 104 described above with respect to FIGS. 1 and 3. In some aspects, communications device 1800 is a network entity, such as a BS 102 of FIGS. 1 and 3, or a disaggregated base station as discussed with respect to FIG. 2. [0202] The communications device 1800 includes a processing system 1805 coupled to the transceiver 1855 (e.g., a transmitter and/or a receiver). In some aspects (e.g., when communications device 1800 is a network entity), processing system 1805 may be coupled to a network interface 1865 that is configured to obtain and send signals for the communications device 1800 via communication link(s), such as a backhaul link, midhaul link, and/or fronthaul link as described herein, such as with respect to FIG. 2. The transceiver 1855 is configured to transmit and receive signals for the communications device 1800 via the antenna 1860, such as the various signals as described herein. The processing system 1805 may be configured to perform processing functions for the communications device 1800, including processing signals received and/or to be transmitted by the communications device 1800.

[0203] The processing system 1805 includes one or more processors 1810. In various aspects, the one or more processors 1810 may be representative of one or more of receive processor 358, transmit processor 364, TX MIMO processor 366, and/or controller/processor 380, as described with respect to FIG. 3. In various aspects, one or more processors 1810 may be representative of one or more of receive processor 338, transmit processor 320, TX MIMO processor 330, and/or controller/processor 340, as described with respect to FIG. 3. The one or more processors 1810 are coupled to a computer-readable medium/memory 1830 via a bus 1850. In certain aspects, the computer-readable medium/memory 1830 is configured to store instructions (e.g., computer-executable code) that when executed by the one or more processors 1810, cause the one or more processors 1810 to perform the method 15200 described with respect to FIG. 16, or any aspect related to it. Note that reference to a processor performing a function of communications device 1800 may include one or more processors 1810 performing that function of communications device 1800.

[0204] In the depicted example, computer-readable medium/memory 1830 stores code (e.g., executable instructions), such as code for receiving 1835, code for obtaining 1840, and code for performing 1845. Processing of the code for receiving 1835, code for obtaining 1840, and code for performing 1845 may cause the communications device 1800 to perform the method 1600 described with respect to FIG. 16, or any aspect related to it. [0205] The one or more processors 1810 include circuitry configured to implement (e.g., execute) the code stored in the computer-readable medium/memory 1830, including circuitry such as circuitry for receiving 1815, circuitry for obtaining 1820, and circuitry for performing 1825. Processing with circuitry for receiving 1815, circuitry for obtaining 1820, and circuitry for performing 1825 may cause the communications device 1800 to perform the method 1600 described with respect to FIG. 16, or any aspect related to it.

[0206] Various components of the communications device 1800 may provide means for performing the method 1600 described with respect to FIG. 16, or any aspect related to it. For example, means for transmitting, sending or outputting for transmission may include transceivers 354 and/or antenna(s) 352 of the UE 104 illustrated in FIG. 3, transceivers 332 and/or antenna(s) 334 of the BS 102 illustrated in FIG. 3, and/or the transceiver 1855 and the antenna 1860 of the communications device 1800 in FIG. 18. Means for receiving or obtaining may include transceivers 354 and/or antenna(s) 352 of the UE 104 illustrated in FIG. 3, transceivers 332 and/or antenna(s) 334 of the BS 102 illustrated in FIG. 3, and/or the transceiver 1855 and the antenna 1860 of the communications device 1800 in FIG. 18.

Example Clauses

[0207] Implementation examples are described in the following numbered clauses:

[0208] Clause 1 : A method for wireless communications by a transmitter, comprising: obtaining a sequence of information bits; performing physical layer processing to generate a sequence of shaped symbols from the sequence of information bits using a probabilistic shaper function; providing security for transmission of the sequence of shaped symbols using at least one code during the physical layer processing; and transmitting the sequence of shaped symbols to a receiver.

[0209] Clause 2: The method of Clause 1, wherein the at least one code comprises at least one key.

[0210] Clause 3: The method of Clause 2, wherein providing the security comprises encoding a set of bits using the key.

[0211] Clause 4: The method of Clause 3, wherein the set of bits comprise at least one of: the sequence of information bits; non-uniform bits generated by the probabilistic shaper function; or uniform bits that bypass the probabilistic shaper function. [0212] Clause 5: The method of Clause 3, wherein the set of bits comprise at least one of: shaped systematic bits after a FEC function; unshaped systematic bits after the FEC function; or parity bits after the FEC function.

[0213] Clause 6: The method of Clause 2, wherein providing the security comprises selecting, based on the key, which bits of the sequence of information bits to use to generate the non-uniform bits and which bits of the sequence of information bits bypass the probabilistic shaper function.

[0214] Clause 7: The method of Clause 2, wherein providing the security comprises selecting, based on the key, the probabilistic shaper function from a plurality of available probabilistic shaper functions.

[0215] Clause 8: The method of Clause 2, wherein: the shaped symbols correspond to points on a QAM constellation; and performing the physical layer processing involves a first mapping function to map shaped systematic bits to amplitudes and a second mapping function to map unshaped systematic bits to signs.

[0216] Clause 9: The method of Clause 8, wherein providing the security comprises at least one of: altering at least one of the first mapping function or a corresponding amplitude, based on the key; altering at least one of the second mapping function or a corresponding sign, based on the key; or encoding the constellation points, based on the key.

[0217] Clause 10: The method of any one of Clauses 1-9, wherein the code comprises a signature generated using a signature maker function.

[0218] Clause 11 : The method of Clause 10, wherein the signature is generated using a signature maker function based on at least one of a configured ID or a key.

[0219] Clause 12: The method of Clause 11, wherein the signature is generated using, as input, at least one of: non-uniform bits generated by the probabilistic shaper function; or uniform bits that bypass the probabilistic shaper function.

[0220] Clause 13 : The method of Clause 11, wherein the signature is generated using, as input, at least one of: shaped systematic bits after a FEC function; unshaped systematic bits after the FEC function; or parity bits after the FEC function. [0221] Clause 14: The method of Clause 10, wherein the signature is mapped to at least one of shaped bits, unshaped bits, or parity bits.

[0222] Clause 15: The method of Clause 14, wherein the signature is encoded with a FEC function before mapping to the at least one of shaped bits, unshaped bits, or parity bits.

[0223] Clause 16: The method of Clause 10, wherein the signature is added as a set of bits after a FEC function and mapped to at least one of an amplitude or sign.

[0224] Clause 17: The method of Clause 10, wherein: performing the physical layer processing involves a first function to convert shaped systematic bits to amplitudes and a second function to convert unshaped systematic bits and parity bits into phases; and the signature is generated based on at least one of output of the first function or output of the second function.

[0225] Clause 18: The method of Clause 10, wherein the signature is determined according to a commitment scheme.

[0226] Clause 19: The method of Clause 18, wherein the signature is determined based on a commitment of bits to the probabilistic shaper function.

[0227] Clause 20: The method of Clause 19, wherein the commitment of bits to the probabilistic shaper function is determined based on at least one of a provided ID or network broadcast parameter.

[0228] Clause 21 : The method of Clause 20, wherein the signature is also determined based on at least one of a timestamp or shaped bits.

[0229] Clause 22: The method of Clause 18, wherein the signature is determined using a hash chain of keys, including: a first key is assigned for uniform bits; and a second key assigned for non-uniform bits generated by the probabilistic shaper function.

[0230] Clause 23 : The method of Clause 22, wherein the first and second keys are indicated by a network entity in reverse order of calculation.

[0231] Clause 24: A method for wireless communications by a receiver, comprising: receiving a sequence of shaped symbols from a transmitter; obtaining at least one code used to provide security for the sequence of shaped symbols; and performing physical layer processing to recover a sequence of information bits from the sequence of shaped symbols, using a probabilistic deshaper function and the at least one code.

[0232] Clause 25: The method of Clause 24, wherein the at least one code comprises at least one key.

[0233] Clause 26: The method of Clause 25, wherein performing physical layer processing to recover a sequence of information bits comprises decoding a set of bits using the key.

[0234] Clause 27: The method of Clause 26, wherein the set of bits comprise at least one of: the sequence of information bits; non-uniform bits generated by the probabilistic shaper function; or uniform bits that bypass the probabilistic shaper function.

[0235] Clause 28: The method of Clause 26, wherein the set of bits comprise at least one of: shaped systematic bits after a FEC function; unshaped systematic bits after the FEC function; or parity bits after the FEC function.

[0236] Clause 29: The method of Clause 25, wherein performing physical layer processing comprises determining, based on the key, which bits of the sequence of information bits were used to generate non-uniform bits and which bits of the sequence of information bits can bypass the probabilistic deshaper function.

[0237] Clause 30: The method of Clause 25, wherein performing physical layer processing comprises determining, based on the key, the probabilistic deshaper function from a plurality of available probabilistic deshaper functions.

[0238] Clause 31 : The method of Clause 25, wherein: the shaped symbols correspond to points on a QAM constellation; and performing the physical layer processing involves a first demapping function to demap amplitudes to shaped systematic bits and a second demapping function to map signs to unshaped systematic bits.

[0239] Clause 32: The method of Clause 31, wherein performing the physical layer processing involves at least one of: determining at least one of the first demapping function or a corresponding amplitude, based on the key; determining at least one of the second demapping function or a corresponding sign, based on the key; or decoding the constellation points, based on the key. [0240] Clause 33: The method of any one of Clauses 24-32, wherein the code comprises a signature generated using a signature maker function.

[0241] Clause 34: The method of Clause 33, wherein the signature is generated using a signature maker function based on at least one of a configured ID or a key.

[0242] Clause 35: The method of Clause 34, wherein the signature is generated using, as input, at least one of non-uniform bits or uniform bits.

[0243] Clause 36: The method of Clause 34, wherein the signature is generated using, as input, at least one of shaped systematic bits, unshaped systematic bits after the FEC function, or parity bits after the FEC function.

[0244] Clause 37: The method of Clause 33, wherein the signature is mapped to at least one of shaped bits, unshaped bits, or parity bits.

[0245] Clause 38: The method of Clause 37, wherein the signature is decoded after demapping at least one of shaped bits, unshaped bits, or parity bits.

[0246] Clause 39: The method of Clause 33, wherein the signature is obtained as a set of bits before a FEC function and demapped from at least one of an amplitude or sign.

[0247] Clause 40: The method of Clause 33, wherein: performing the physical layer processing involves a first function to convert amplitudes to shaped systematic bits and a second function to convert phases to unshaped systematic bits and parity bits; and the signature is obtained based on at least one of input of the first function or input of the second function.

[0248] Clause 41 : The method of Clause 33, wherein the signature is determined according to a commitment scheme.

[0249] Clause 42: The method of Clause 41, wherein the signature is determined based on a commitment of bits to the probabilistic deshaper function.

[0250] Clause 43 : The method of Clause 42, wherein the commitment of bits to the probabilistic deshaper function is determined based on at least one of a provided ID or network broadcast parameter.

[0251] Clause 44: The method of Clause 43, wherein the signature is also determined based on at least one of a timestamp or shaped bits. [0252] Clause 45: The method of Clause 41, wherein the signature is determined using a hash chain of keys, including: a first key is assigned for uniform bits; and a second key assigned for non-uniform bits generated by the probabilistic deshaper function.

[0253] Clause 46: The method of Clause 45, wherein the first and second keys are indicated by a network entity in reverse order of calculation.

[0254] Clause 47: The method of any one of Clauses 24-46, further comprising at least one of: transmitting signaling indicating a change in how the transmitter is to provide the security; or receiving signaling indicating a change in how the transmitter is to provide the security.

[0255] Clause 48: The method of any one of Clauses 1-23, further comprising at least one of: receiving signaling indicating a change in how the transmitter is to provide the security; or transmitting signaling indicating a change in how the transmitter is to provide the security.

[0256] Clause 49: An apparatus, comprising: a memory comprising executable instructions; and a processor configured to execute the executable instructions and cause the apparatus to perform a method in accordance with any one of Clauses 1-48.

[0257] Clause 50: An apparatus, comprising means for performing a method in accordance with any one of Clauses 1-48.

[0258] Clause 51 : A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising executable instructions that, when executed by a processor of an apparatus, cause the apparatus to perform a method in accordance with any one of Clauses 1-48.

[0259] Clause 52: A computer program product embodied on a computer-readable storage medium comprising code for performing a method in accordance with any one of Clauses 1-48.

Additional Considerations

[0260] The preceding description is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to practice the various aspects described herein. The examples discussed herein are not limiting of the scope, applicability, or aspects set forth in the claims. Various modifications to these aspects will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be applied to other aspects. For example, changes may be made in the function and arrangement of elements discussed without departing from the scope of the disclosure. Various examples may omit, substitute, or add various procedures or components as appropriate. For instance, the methods described may be performed in an order different from that described, and various actions may be added, omitted, or combined. Also, features described with respect to some examples may be combined in some other examples. For example, an apparatus may be implemented or a method may be practiced using any number of the aspects set forth herein. In addition, the scope of the disclosure is intended to cover such an apparatus or method that is practiced using other structure, functionality, or structure and functionality in addition to, or other than, the various aspects of the disclosure set forth herein. It should be understood that any aspect of the disclosure disclosed herein may be embodied by one or more elements of a claim.

[0261] The various illustrative logical blocks, modules and circuits described in connection with the present disclosure may be implemented or performed with a general purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an ASIC, a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device (PLD), discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof designed to perform the functions described herein. A general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor may be any commercially available processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. A processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, a system on a chip (SoC), or any other such configuration.

[0262] As used herein, a phrase referring to “at least one of’ a list of items refers to any combination of those items, including single members. As an example, “at least one of: a, b, or c” is intended to cover a, b, c, a-b, a-c, b-c, and a-b-c, as well as any combination with multiples of the same element (e.g., a-a, a-a-a, a-a-b, a-a-c, a-b-b, a-c-c, b-b, b-b-b, b-b-c, c-c, and c-c-c or any other ordering of a, b, and c).

[0263] As used herein, the term “determining” encompasses a wide variety of actions. For example, “determining” may include calculating, computing, processing, deriving, investigating, looking up (e.g., looking up in a table, a database or another data structure), ascertaining and the like. Also, “determining” may include receiving (e.g., receiving information), accessing (e.g., accessing data in a memory) and the like. Also, “determining” may include resolving, selecting, choosing, establishing and the like. [0264] The methods disclosed herein comprise one or more actions for achieving the methods. The method actions may be interchanged with one another without departing from the scope of the claims. In other words, unless a specific order of actions is specified, the order and/or use of specific actions may be modified without departing from the scope of the claims. Further, the various operations of methods described above may be performed by any suitable means capable of performing the corresponding functions. The means may include various hardware and/or software component(s) and/or module(s), including, but not limited to a circuit, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or processor.

[0265] The following claims are not intended to be limited to the aspects shown herein, but are to be accorded the full scope consistent with the language of the claims. Within a claim, reference to an element in the singular is not intended to mean “one and only one” unless specifically so stated, but rather “one or more.” Unless specifically stated otherwise, the term “some” refers to one or more. No claim element is to be construed under the provisions of 35 U.S.C. §112(f) unless the element is expressly recited using the phrase “means for”. All structural and functional equivalents to the elements of the various aspects described throughout this disclosure that are known or later come to be known to those of ordinary skill in the art are expressly incorporated herein by reference and are intended to be encompassed by the claims. Moreover, nothing disclosed herein is intended to be dedicated to the public regardless of whether such disclosure is explicitly recited in the claims.