SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR ACCESS AUTHENTICATION IN A MOBILE WIRELESS NETWORK

TECHNICAL FIELD OF THE INVENTION

This invention relates in general to mobile communications, and more particularly to a system and method for access authentication in a mobile wireless network .

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The phenomenal growth of information technology and the Internet, and the general population's desire for timely information services, create a need for a high performance wireless Internet technology.

Current CDMA2000 data networks, though, rely on the Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) to establish wireless networking sessions. Such a reliance on PPP results in a significant performance bottleneck. PPP signaling is not optimized for a wireless environment, particularly for handoff scenarios. PPP authentication and call setup time may be in the order of several seconds, which is unacceptable for most real-time telephony applications. Moreover, a single PPP session requires substantial memory resources, and the PPP state machine is quite processing and memory intensive.

Accordingly, there is a need for improved systems and methods for access authentication in a mobile wireless network that reduce call setup times.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

In accordance with the present invention, the disadvantages and problems associated with authentication and call setup in a mobile wireless network have been

substantially reduced or eliminated. In particular, the present invention improves the speed of authentication and call setup by reducing or eliminating the PPP setup latency associated with current systems, and avoids unnecessary signaling exchanged between certain components in a mobile wireless network.

In accordance with one embodiment of the present invention, a method is provided for authenticating access in a mobile wireless network. In such an embodiment, the method comprises exchanging an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) packet with an access terminal over a high rate packet data radio link and a signaling interface through a radio access network, encapsulating the EAP packet in an authentication authorization and accounting (AAA) packet, and sending the AAA packet to an authentication server for authentication.

In accordance with another embodiment of the present invention, a gateway system is provided for facilitating authenticating access in a mobile wireless network. In such an embodiment, the gateway system comprises a radio access network interface, an authenticator, and an IP network interface. The radio access network is for exchanging an extensible authentication protocol (EAP) packet with an access terminal over a high rate packet data radio link and a signaling interface through a radio access network. The authenticator is for encapsulating the EAP packet in an authentication authorization and accounting '(AAA) packet, and the IP network interface is for sending the AAA packet to an authentication server. Important technical advantages of certain embodiments of the present invention include fast handoff between neighboring radio network controllers and IP gateways .

Other important technical advantages of certain embodiments of the present invention may include low- latency inter-technology handoff, such as between CDMA and WIiAN networks. Moreover, certain embodiments may simplify the generation and distribution of keys used for network authentication, and may eliminate one or more interfaces between network components.

Other technical advantages of the present invention may be readily apparent to one skilled in the art from the following figures, descriptions, and claims. Moreover, while specific advantages have been enumerated above, various embodiments may include all, some, or none of the enumerated advantages .

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

For a more complete understanding of the present invention and its advantages, reference is now made to the following description, taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which: FIGURE 1 is a simplified component diagram of an example mobile wireless communication system for exchanging data in accordance with certain teachings of the present invention;

FIGURE 2 is a sequence diagram that illustrates the various layers involved in the protocol operation for access authentication in certain embodiments of the present invention;

FIGURE 3 is a simplified diagram that illustrates an AAA protocol stack for exchanging EAP messages in certain embodiments of the present invention; and

FIGURE 4 is a sequence diagram that illustrates HRPD authentication according to one embodiment of the present invention using EAP and the AKA protocol .

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

FIGURE 1 is a simplified component diagram of an example mobile wireless communication system 10 for exchanging data in accordance with certain teachings of the present invention. ^■ As FIGURE 1 illustrates, one embodiment of the present invention comprises a High Rate

Packet Data (HRPD) network that uses an authentication mechanism based on the Extensible Authentication Protocol

(EAP) . Such an embodiment may implement a three-way handshake between an access terminal (AT) 12, an IP gateway (IPGW) 14 (via a radio network controller (RNC) in a radio access network (RAN) 16) , and an authentication server 18.

According to certain teachings of the present invention, EAP messages are carried over the air between AT 12 and RAN 16 using the HRPD over-the-air signaling protocol. EAP messages are transmitted over CDMA between AT 12 and RAN 16. AT 12 may act as an EAP peer, while RAN 16 may act as an EAP relay agent that forwards EAP messages to IPGW 14 via a signaling interface. One aspect of the present invention comprises an EAP-based authenticator that resides within IPGW 14. From IPGW 14, EAP messages may be carried over an Access Authentication & Accounting (AAA) protocol (such as RADIUS or DIAMETER) to authentication server 18, possibly through one or more AAA proxy servers (not pictured) . According to certain teachings of the present invention, authentication server 18 may be an AAA server or a proprietary security manager, and provides the functions of an EAP server. In FIGURE 1, authentication server 18 is depicted as a proprietary security manager in a home network ("H-SM") .

EAP may be used for both device and service authentication. Accordingly, EAP may be used back-to-

back, once for accessing RAN 16 (i.e. device authentication) and once for establishing an IP connection with IP network 20 (i.e. service authentication) . As FIGURE 1 illustrates, both authentication sequences may terminate in the same authentication server in a home network. Such double EAP authentication may be necessary before AT 12 is authorized to access IP services. Depending on the deployment scenario and the operator' s authentication policy, it may be possible for AT 12 to perform a single EAP authentication, such as when AT 12 is authenticated either during device authentication or service authentication (but not both) .

According to certain teachings of the present invention, the protocol used between AT 12 (an EAP peer) and IPGW 14 (an EAP authenticator) is based on EAP. EAP messages are encapsulated in HRPD packets for transport between AT 12 and RAN 16.

EAP over HRPD may be used to authenticate devices using the Enhanced Multi-Flow Packet Application in conjunction with HRPD Rev. A. According to teachings of the present invention, an EAP authenticator may be located in an IPGW and, accordingly, an HRPD RAN may relay EAP messages over an All interface to the EAP authenticator. An AAA client in the IPGW may then encapsulate the EAP messages in AAA packets and forward them to an EAP server in a home network for authentication. The protocol used between IPGW 14 and authentication server 18 may be based on DIAMETER (with support for EAP) . if mobility service and access service are provided by the same operator, then only one EAP authentication may be required.

Alternatively, a RAN may . use an A12 interface to carry device authentication within the Access Service Provider's network. Device authentication then may be terminated in an EAP server. In such a configuration, the EAP authenticator may be in the RAN and there may be no need to use the EAP relay function. Note, though, that if access service and mobility service are provided by the same operator, then there may be no need to use A12 for device authentication. FIGURE 2 is a sequence diagram that illustrates the various layers involved in the protocol operation for access authentication in certain embodiments of the present invention. More particularly, FIGURE 2 illustrates layers involved in an EAP exchange between several EAP-based entities, including an EAP peer, an EAP relay, an EAP authenticator, and an EAP server. According to certain teachings of the present invention, an EAP peer may be implemented in an access terminal, an EAP relay may be implemented in an RNC, an EAP authenticator may be implemented in an IPGW, and an EAP server may be implemented in an authentication server

(such as an AAA server or H-SM) . FIGURE 2 also depicts an authentication server located in a visited network (V-

SM) , which may or may not participate in an EAP exchange. As FIGURE 2 demonstrates, EAP methods generally are encapsulated in EAP packets for transit between access terminal 12 (the EAP peer) and authentication server 18

(the EAP server) . For transit between access terminal 12 and RAN 16, the EAP packets are further encapsulated in lower layer protocols (e.g. HRPD/CDMA) . Upon reaching RAN 16, EAP packets are removed from the lower level packets used for transit between access terminal 12 and RAN 16, and are re-packaged in lower level protocols

appropriate for transit between RAN 16 and IPGW 14. IPGW 14, in turn, removes the EAP packets from these lower level protocol packets and re-packages them for transit to authentication server 18. In certain embodiments, IPGW 14 packages these EAP packets in AAA packets and then encapsulates the AAA packets in TCP/IP packets (as shown in FIGURE 2) , which may be appropriate for DIAMETER-based authentication. Alternatively, IPGW 14 may encapsulate the AAA packets in other lower layer packets, such as UDP, which may be appropriate for RADIUS-based authentication.

FIGURE 3 is a simplified diagram that illustrates an AAA protocol stack for exchanging EAP messages in certain embodiments of the present invention. FIGURE 3 illustrates a variety of network interfaces that may exist between a RAN and an authentication server. As in FIGURE 2 , FIGURE 3 demonstrates how EAP packets are encapsulated in various lower-level protocol packets for transport various network components of communication system 10. For instance, in RAN 16, EAP packets are encapsulated in signaling protocol packets (e.g. All packets) and other lower layer packets for transport to IPGW 16. IPGW 16 receives the lower layer packets and extracts the EAP packets. IPGW 16 then re-packages the EAP packets in authentication protocol packets (e.g. AAA packets) and other lower layer packets for transport through IP network 20. These packets may pass through several optional, intermediary components, but ultimately reach authentication server 18. Authentication server 18 then extracts the EAP packets from the lower layer packets, as depicted in FIGURE 3.

In certain embodiments of the present invention, device authentication in communication system 10 may

require an exchange of EAP messages between AT 12 and IPGW 14. In one embodiment, the EAP messages are carried in Mobile IP Vendor-Specific Extensions (VSEs) over an All interface, using existing messages. New VSEs may be defined and used for transporting EAP data over the All interface. EAP data may include EAP messages, as well as keys derived from the EAP exchange that are intended for RAN 16. EAP messages sent over an All interface also may need to be secured, particularly if mobility services and access services are operated by different entities.

EAP authentication may produce a Master Session Key

(MSK) that is derived by the AT and authentication server. In accordance with certain teachings of the present invention, the authentication server transmits the key securely to the EAP authenticator residing in the IPGW. The authenticator may then use this key to derive other keys for traffic protection and other purposes. In certain embodiments, key material may be derived for the RAN and installed for on-the-air protection. An AT may use a similar key derivation to derive keys to match the keys derived by the network. Key derivation generally is the same if double or single authentication is used. Mobility keys may be derived from an Extended MSK by the EAP server residing in the authentication server. The server may use a root key to generate all other keys. Such keys may be bootstrapped during authentication and cached in the IPGW. EAP keys are generated both in the AT and in the EAP server.

FIGURE 4 is a sequence diagram that illustrates HRPD authentication according to one embodiment of the present invention using EAP and the Authentication & Key Agreement (AKA) protocol . According to teachings of the present invention, IPGW 14 and access terminal 12

exchange EAP packets over a high rate packet data (HRPD) radio link and a signaling interface through RAN 16. IPGW 14 then encapsulates the EAP packets in an authentication protocol packet (e.g. an AAA packet) and sends the AAA packet to authentication server 18 for further processing. Authentication server 18, in turn, may authenticate access based on the EAP packets. In the embodiment depicted in FIGURE 4, for instance, authentication server 18 may run an AKA algorithm to generate certain authentication challenges and responses, which are returned to access terminal 12 through IPGW 14 and RAN 16. Access terminal 12 then may verify the challenges and responses and generate its own authentication challenge and response, which is sent back to authentication server 18. As part of this exchange, authentication server 18 and access terminal 12 may mutually derive a session key. Authentication server 18 may then send this session key to IPGW 14 for use in establishing link layer security with access. terminal 12. AKA is based on challenge-response mechanisms and symmetric cryptography. Compared to legacy authentication methods, AKA generally provides stronger security with longer key lengths and the authentication of both client and server. Although the present invention has been described with several embodiments, a myriad of changes, variations, alterations, transformations, and modifications may be suggested to one skilled in the art, and it is intended that the present invention encompass such changes, variations, alterations, transformations, and modifications as fall within the scope of the appended claims .

For instance, example embodiments of the present invention have been described above in which EAP is used to provide a flexible authentication mechanism, but other protocols may be used instead of or in addition to EAP. In particular, any authentication protocol that supports multiple authentication mechanisms and dynamic negotiation of authentication mechanisms may be suitable for implementing the principles of the present invention. Moreover, the authentication mechanisms described herein are intended to be illustrative and not exclusive. Other authentication mechanisms, including other shared secret protocols and certificate-based mechanisms such as Transport Layer Security, may be used without departing from the spirit of the present invention.