The invention concerns a method for authenticating biometric data to secure a vaping device. It also relates to a vaping device configured to implement said method, and to a computer-readable storage medium storing instructions of a computer program for implementing said method.

Background of the invention

Vaping device, also called aerosol generating system, allows vaporization of a product, generally a liquid, often called e-liquid or e-juice. Such vaping device is also commonly called vaporizer or electronic cigarette. A vaping device is thus a portable device comprising an electric heat source that heats the product (e-liquid) to create an aerosol that the user inhales, and a battery to power the heat source.

It is highly desirable to have a vaping device that is secured, for example by a biometric data authentication method. For example, document US20200342507 to Hubbard et at. deals with an electronic nicotine delivery systems ("ENDS") device in which identity and age can be verified.

However, security concerns exist with personal biometric data being stored on a handy device, because such a handy device can be easily lost or stolen.

This makes quite high a risk of having sensitive biometric data ending up in wrong hands.

Even if the biometric data are secured (for instance by encryption) the data are still vulnerable, especially if the device is physically in the possession of the attacker.

Therefore, one of the biggest issues with biometric security is the risk of getting the highly personal biometric data compromised and reused for further attacks. For example, if fingerprint data, which are stored on a vaping device, are compromised, then they could be used in a so-called spoofing attack, falsely using the user’s identity when accessing a fingerprint sensor secured restricted section, or even the user’s smartphone. Thus, the present invention aims at limiting risks that personal biometric data, like fingerprint data, which are stored on a vaping device, can be compromised, and possibly reused for further attacks.

Summary of the invention The present invention thus relates to a vaping device biometric data authentication method.

According to the invention, the method comprises a calibration step which comprises steps of: transforming at least one original biometric data set into an original cryptographic hashed result, and erasing at least each of the at least one original biometric data set, so that no vulnerable data is available on the device.

By transforming the biometric data into a cryptographic hash, and erasing the original biometric data, no vulnerable data are available on the device. Such a method is particularly simple and cheap to be implemented in a vaping device with very limited processing power.

The method is also not very resource intensive, and therefore suitable for such vaping devices because power requirements for vaping devices are critical, as the most energy is needed for the vaping itself, and it is very detrimental to use battery power for other purposes.

No connectivity feature is required thus the method can be performed in an autonomous unit.

According to one embodiment, the calibration step is implemented by a microprocessor of the vaping device. For example, the at least one original biometric data set is transformed into the original cryptographic hashed result by the microprocessor of the vaping device. According to an example embodiment, the calibration step comprises a step of acquiring the at least one original biometric data set.

For example, the at least one original biometric data set comprises at least one physiological property, and/or at least one behaviour property. A physiological property comprises for example a fingerprint.

A behaviour property comprises for example a hand movement.

According to one embodiment, the at least one original biometric data set is acquired by a biometric sensor of the vaping device.

According to an example embodiment, the transforming step comprises a step of processing each of the at least one original biometric data set.

Such processing step comprises for example a step of extracting at least one feature from each of the at least one original biometric data set, providing at least one original extracted feature for each of the at least one original data set.

For example, the at least one original biometric data set is temporarily stored in a memory of the vaping device.

According to an example embodiment, the step of erasing at least the at least one original biometric data set is performed when the at least one original extracted feature has been provided.

Flere, “when” means for example within few minutes, for example 2 minutes, or even 1 minute after a previous feature has been provided or stored, or even as soon as it has been provided or stored.

According to an example embodiment, the transforming step comprises a step of normalizing each of the at least one original extracted feature, providing at least one original normalized feature for each of the at least one original extracted feature.

For example, the step of normalizing comprises data binning, like discrete binning or bucketing, or rounding or truncation. According to an example embodiment, the calibration step comprises a step of erasing the at least one original extracted feature when the at least one original normalized feature has been provided. According to an example embodiment, the transforming step comprising a step of hashing a combination of the at least one original normalized feature using a cryptographic hashing function, providing the original cryptographic hashed result. For example, the cryptographic hashing function depends on a parameter associated with the vaping device.

Thus, the hashing function can be made individual for each device, for example by providing a seed or other modification for the hash function based on a unique number associated with the device, for example a unique serial number. According to an example embodiment, the calibration step comprises a step of erasing the at least one original normalized feature when the original cryptographic hashed result has been provided, or even stored as the reference data.

According to an example embodiment, the calibration step comprises a step of storing the original cryptographic hashed result as reference data in a permanent memory storage of the device.

According to an example embodiment, the method then comprises an unlocking step which comprises a step of comparing a measurement result with the reference data, the device being unlocked if the measurement result corresponds the reference data.

Here, “correspond” here means that the result is the same as the reference data, within a predetermined tolerance.

According to an example embodiment, the unlocking step (20) comprising steps of: - measuring (22) at least one biometric data set, for example by the biometric sensor of the vaping device; transforming (21) the at least one biometric data set into a cryptographic hashed result, comprising steps of:

- processing (23) the biometric data set, which comprises a step of extracting at least one feature from each of the at least one the biometric data set, proving at least one extracted feature for each of the at least one biometric data set;

- normalizing (24) each of the at least one extracted feature, providing at least one normalized feature for each of the at least one extracted feature;

- hashing (25) the at least one normalized feature using the cryptographic hashing function, providing the cryptographic hashed result; and temporarily storing (26) the cryptographic hashed result as the measurement result; running the comparing step (28); and erasing (27) at least each of the at least one biometric data set.

To unlock the vaping device, biometric data are similarly processed as during the calibration step and compared to the stored hash value. According to an example embodiment, during at least one of the transforming steps, a heater and/or a vaping control circuit of the vaping device is switched off to preserve power.

According to an example embodiment, the step of erasing at least each of the at least one biometric data set is performed when the at least one extracted feature has been provided.

According to an example embodiment, the unlocking step comprises a step of erasing each of the at least one extracted feature when the at least one normalized feature has been provided.

According to an example embodiment, the unlocking step comprises a step of erasing each of the at least one normalized feature when the cryptographic hashed result has been provided, or even stored as the measurement result.

The invention also relates to a vaping device comprising a microprocessor running firmware configured for implementing a method as described above.

The functions of the method can thus be implemented on the technology platform available. The vaping device is a standalone device, without communication needed with another external device.

In other words, the steps of the method can all be implemented within the vaping device itself, and more particularly by the microprocessor, and optionally by any other component of the vaping device.

A vaping device generally comprises a vaping control circuit, which includes for example a heater.

The vaping device also generally comprises a power source, like a battery, which can be recharged. For example, the vaping control circuit can be switched off while the method according to one embodiment of the invention is run, so that saving power resource.

The vaping device may also comprise a permanent memory storage for the original cryptographic hashed result, which is determined during the calibration step, to be stored as reference data.

According to one interesting embodiment, the vaping device may also comprise a biometric sensor for acquiring at least one biometric data set.

At least parts of the method according to the invention may be computer implemented. Thus, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product embodied in any tangible medium of expression having computer usable program code embodied in the medium.

Since the present invention can be implemented in software, the present invention can be embodied as computer readable code for provision to a programmable apparatus on any suitable carrier medium.

A tangible, non-transitory carrier medium may comprise a storage medium such as a solid state memory device and the like.

A transient carrier medium may include a signal such as an electrical signal, an electronic signal, an optical signal, an acoustic signal, a magnetic signal or an electromagnetic signal, e.g. a microwave or RF signal.

Thus, the invention also relates to a computer program product for a computing device, the computer program product comprising a sequence of instructions for implementing a method as described above, when loaded into and executed by the computing device.

The invention also relates to a computer-readable storage medium storing instructions of a computer program for implementing a method as described above.

The invention also relates to a program for a computing device, the program comprising a sequence of instructions for implementing a method as described above, when loaded into and executed by the computing device.

The invention also relates to a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing instructions of a computer program for implementing a method as described above.

Brief description of the drawings

Other particularities and advantages of the invention will also emerge from the following description.

In the accompanying drawings, given by way of non-limiting examples:

- Figure 1 diagrammatically illustrates an example embodiment of the vaping device biometric data authentication method according to the invention;

- Figure 2 illustrates an example embodiment of a calibration step of the method;

- Figure 3 illustrates an example embodiment of an unlocking step of the method;

- Figure 4 illustrates an example embodiment of a comparing step of the unlocking step; - Figure 5 illustrates a vaping device for implementing the method; and

- Figure 6 illustrates a schematic block diagram of a computing device for implementation of a method according to an example embodiment of the invention.

Detailed Description As diagrammatically illustrated in Fig. 1, one example embodiment of a vaping device biometric data authentication method 100 according to the invention comprises a calibration step 10, and then at least one unlocking step 20. The calibration step 10 is for example performed one time, for example when the device is bought. It can also be performed when the device is reinitialised.

The unlocking step 20 can be performed each time a user wishes to use the vaping device.

The calibration step 10 is illustrated in fig. 2 according to one example embodiment. According to this example, the calibration step 10 mainly comprises:

- A step of transforming 11 at least one original biometric data set into an original cryptographic hashed result, and

- A step of erasing 17 at least each of the at least one original biometric data set.

Thus, no vulnerable data remains available in the device.

For example, each original biometric data set is erased at the latest when the original cryptographic hashed result has been provided, or even stored as reference data.

Erasing possibilities are further described below.

As illustrated in Fig. 2, the calibration step 10 comprises a step of acquiring 12 at least one original biometric data set, for example n original biometric data sets, with n at least equal to 1.

The transforming step 11 comprises for example:

- A step of processing 13 each of the n original biometric data set for original feature extraction; in this example, one original extracted feature is provided for each of the n original data sets, therefore providing n original extracted features; - A step of normalizing 14 each of the n original extracted feature; in this example, one original normalized feature is provided for each of the n original extracted features, therefore providing n original normalized features;

- A step of hashing 15 a combination of the n original normalized features using a cryptographic hashing function, therefore providing one original cryptographic hashed result; and

Then, the calibration step 10 comprises a step of storing 16 the original cryptographic hashed result as reference data, in particular in a permanent memory storage of the vaping device. The step of acquiring 12 at least one original biometric data set can be performed according to technologies known in the art.

Many kinds of biometric measurements can be used.

The at least one original biometric data set comprises for example at least one physiological property, and/or at least one behaviour property. For example, physiological property relates to a property of the body, whereas a behaviour property relates to a behaviour of the user.

For example, a behaviour property can be at least one of: movements of the device, or impacts like for instance tapping; interaction between the vaping device and a hand or a finger of the user; - detection of areas of the device being covered by a hand or a finger.

A physiological property (that is linked to a body part of the user) is for example:

- a fingerprint, a blood vein recognition (for fingertips etc.),

- handshape recognition, a facial recognition, including partial facial recognition (like mouth shape) as well as iris,

- DNA,

- resistance of a body part (by bio-impedance).

The at least one original biometric data set comprises for example one property of one type, or several properties of one type (called as “multimode”), or a combination of at least one of both types (called as “mixed mode”), or others. Security is enhanced by measuring more than one property at the same time, like for example instead of using a single biometric property (like a fingerprint).

The acquired biometric data, which are typically analogue, are then generally converted to digital data.

According to one example embodiment, the processing step 13 comprises a step of extracting at least one feature from each of the n original biometric data set.

For example, a function of the extracting step can depend on the kind of the biometric data set.

The feature extraction of processing step 13 can be as it is known in the art.

For example, only one most relevant data is selected among each of the n original biometric data set. Such a selection can be dependent on the type of biometric data set that is acquired.

This involves typically discarding irrelevant data (like noise, not distinctive data etc). This results in a smaller data set. The resulting data set, being the original extracted feature, can be for example in the form of a list of numbers or matrices.

The processing step 13 thus provides at least one original extracted feature for each of the n original data set.

More than one extracted feature has the advantage of better results but at the cost of extra calculation resources. The normalizing step 14 can then be performed as follows.

The extracted feature is potentially normalized because hashing functions may be sensitive to input variations. Therefore, normalization reduces potential variations.

In one example embodiment, data binning (also sometimes referred to as discrete binning or bucketing) is used. Alternatives would be rounding or truncation. With data binning, a sort of averaging out of the data is achieved. This has the advantage of always slightly variable input from the user not to result in large number false negatives for the authentication of the user during the unlocking step described below. The normalization can be optimized to provide a good representation of the extracted features (therefore good identification) without resulting in too generic results (otherwise lower security).

For example, an optimizing function can depend on the kind of the biometric data set. The normalization is for example specific for each tested biometric mode, or even to each kind of biometric data set.

Then, the step of hashing 15 a combination of the n original normalized feature(s) relies on a cryptographic hashing function.

Cryptographic hashing functions are known in the art. Any suitable function can be used.

According to one example embodiment, the chosen function meets at least one of the following criteria:

- has few collisions,

- produces a wide range of hashed values, - is deterministic, that is to produce the same hashed output every time for the same input,

- is quick to compute the hash value for any given data input,

- makes infeasible to generate a data set that yields a given hash value.

Suitable functions are for example of the SHA family (SHA1-3), BLAKE family (BLAKE2-3), or RIPEMD-160.

In one example embodiment, the hashing function can be made individual for each device.

For example, the cryptographic hashing function can depend on a parameter associated with the device, for example by providing a seed or other modification for the hash function based on a unique number associated with the device, for example a unique serial number. If more than one normalized feature is used, the hash function is applied to a combination of the original normalized features (or to a combination of the n normalized features during the unlocking step 20 which is described below). This provides further protection, as even a compromised hash in an attack will not result in information distinctly related to a single biometric data set.

This makes even data obtained from a compromised hash completely useless for run outside the individual device.

In the very unlikely case of the hash function being compromised, only the normalized feature would be retrieved.

This is one step remote from the extracted feature, which is in itself one step remote from the original biometric data set.

This would mean that in the unlikely event of a compromised hash function, only the specific device is exposed. The underlying biometric data set would be nearly impossibly retrieved, thus preventing the use of the personal data from attack outside the specific vaping device.

The step of hashing 15 a combination of the n original normalized features then provides the original cryptographic hashed result. All the steps of the transforming step 11 , including temporary storage of data or features, are done in volatile memory.

Only the original cryptographic hashed result is stored in a permanent way as reference data, during the storing step 16.

This ensures that no biometric data remains stored (i.e. vulnerable to attack) on the vaping device.

The stored original cryptographic hashed result cannot be decrypted to yield the original biometric data set by design, as described above (non- reversible nature of hashing function).

Each of the n original biometric data sets can be erased at the latest when the original cryptographic hashed result has been provided or stored as reference data, for example within few minutes, for example 2 minutes, or even 1 minute after the original cryptographic hashed result has been provided or stored, or even as soon as it has been provided or stored.

However, each of the n original biometric data sets can be erased when the corresponding original extracted feature has been provided, for example within few minutes, for example 2 minutes, or even 1 minute after the original extracted feature has been provided, or even as soon as it has been provided.

In an analogous manner, each original extracted feature can be erased when the corresponding original normalized feature has been provided, and then each of the original normalized feature can be erased when the original cryptographic hashed result has been provided (i.e. within few minutes, for example 2 minutes, or even 1 minute after the previous feature has been provided, or even as soon as it has been provided).

Otherwise, the features can be erased at the end of the calibration step, when the original cryptographic hashed result has been stored as reference data.

Alternatively, any data or feature should be erased effectively from a permanent memory, in particular the biometric data set should be erased as soon as the extracted feature has taken place, or after a delay as mentioned above, for example within few minutes, or 2 minutes, or 1 minute or less.

One extracted feature should be erased as soon as the corresponding normalized feature is available (or after a delay), and one normalized feature should be erased as soon as the original cryptographic hashed result has been calculated or stored. Erasing should include the complete removal of the previous data or feature, not merely changing pointer entries in memory management.

Therefore, the step of erasing 17 at least each of the at least one original biometric data set can take place at the end of the calibration step 10, after the transforming step 11 , or during the transforming step 11. To ensure that the data or the feature is actually deleted, several options are available, like for example: 1. A memory location with a fixed memory address (and corresponding memory space) is reserved for the storage of the vulnerable data. The biometric data is always written to this fixed memory address. After use and at time of the deletion, the fixed memory space is overwritten with (for example) zeros or any other suitable overwriting scheme. This ensures quite robust data deletion, mitigating data remanence. In this case, the memory management of the operating system can need to be adapted to store the data in the same physical address. However, this can lead to a quicker wear of the memory elements.

2. Alternatively, if the memory management of the operating system employs dynamic memory management (load leveling), the portion of the memory storing the sensitive data is changed each time, ensuring reduced wear out of individual memory locations. To ensure correct data deletion by overwriting, the physical location of the used memory blocks need to be stored, and the data deletion by overwriting needs to be based on the physical location within the memory chip set.

3. Overall, many operating systems work with virtual memory blocks of a fixed length. This means that for effective deletion, the number and individual starting points of each memory block need to be stored or tracked. The deletion needs then to take place by locating and overwriting all the individual (physical) memory blocks.

4. Additionally, the just overwritten memory blocks can be read to confirm that the intended overwriting pattern (for example the zero’s) are in fact effectively written.

5. If the data is processed, at least on the system level, in blocks of fixed length, the processing of each individual block can be done, followed by an immediate deletion, that is before the next memory block is processed. This further improves the security in case the device is attacked during processing.

6. Data deletion and confirmation after every single processing step:

- After feature extraction, immediately delete the raw biometric data set from the memory (using one of the methods mentioned above), and verify the deletion (for example by reading out the overwritten memory), and only proceed to the normalization step 14 after positive confirmation of the deletion. - Similarly, the extracted feature is deleted after normalization, and only after positive confirmation of the deletion, the next hashing step 15 is carried out.

- Again, the normalized feature is deleted and confirmed to be deleted before the system moves on to further tasks. For the authentication during the unlocking step 20 described below, the same procedure is used to obtain the authentication hash (for comparison with the stored original hashed result). This has the similar safety benefits.

Then, the unlocking step 20 is performed similarly, as illustrated in fig. 3. For example, it comprises same step as during the calibration step 10 on the basis of at least one biometric data set to provide a cryptographic hashed result.

Therefore, same numeral references are used for corresponding steps, but beginning with “2”. The at least one biometric data set which is acquired in the acquiring step 22 of the unlocking step 20 shall correspond to at least one of the n original biometric data set acquired during the acquiring step 12 of the calibration step 10. For example, the unlocking step 20 comprising steps of:

- measuring 22 at least one biometric data set; - transforming 21 the at least one biometric data set into a cryptographic hashed result, comprising steps of:

- processing 23 the biometric data set, which comprises a step of extracting at least one feature from each of the at least one the biometric data set, proving at least one extracted feature for each of the at least one biometric data set;

- normalizing 24 each of the at least one extracted feature, providing at least one normalized feature for each of the at least one extracted feature;

- hashing 25 the at least one normalized feature using the cryptographic hashing function, providing the cryptographic hashed result; and - temporarily storing 26 the cryptographic hashed result as a measurement result; - running a step of comparing 28 the measurement result with the reference data stored in storing step 16 of the calibration step 10; and

- erasing 27 at least each of the at least one biometric data set.

According to one example embodiment, all the biometric data sets acquired in the acquiring step 22 of the unlocking step 20 are the same as the n original biometric data set acquired during the acquiring step 12 of the calibration step 10.

For example, if one fingerprint and one hand movement have been acquired in the calibration step 10, the user should use same fingerprint and do same hand movement for the acquiring step 22 of the unlocking step 20.

Then, same functions as in the step of processing 13, the step of normalizing 14, and the step of hashing 15 of the calibration step 10 shall be used for the step of processing 23, the step of normalizing 24, and the step of hashing 25 of the unlocking step 20. Then, the cryptographic hashed result is compared to the stored reference data in the comparing step 28.

The comparing step 28 is detailed in fig. 4.

The hashing step 15 of the calibration step 10 has provided the reference data, which corresponds to the original cryptographic hashed result, and the hashing step 25 of the unlocking step 20 has provided the cryptographic hashed result.

The vaping device is unlocked if the cryptographic hashed result corresponds to, for example is the same as, the reference data.

Otherwise, if the cryptographic hashed result differs from the reference data, the vaping device is not unlocked.

Any biometric data set acquired and any feature determined during the unlocking step 20, as well as the cryptographic hashed result, are erased, in a similar manner as described above in connection with the features and original biometric data set of the calibration step 10. Similarly, the erasing step 27 of at least each of the at least one biometric data set can take place at the end of the unlocking step 20, after the transforming step 21 , or during the transforming step 21. And during the unlocking step 20, the cryptographic hashed result and the measurement result are erased as well.

Thus, only the original cryptographic hashed result of one calibration step 10 remains stored in the vaping device. All these steps are run on the vaping device itself, without a need for any transmission of data to the outside world, i.e. out of the device. This is in particular an advantage if the vaping device does not have any connectivity features (other than charging), as it can be marketed to people that take their data security seriously. This also improves the security in case of a lost device, where an attacker does not know the identity of the owner, and even if successful, cannot match biometric data to a known individual.

Besides, the device does not register any data that can be linked to an individual user. The current implementation can be implemented with relatively low processing power, which is suited to the simple vaping devices where this is going to be used.

The standalone nature of the implementation do not require processing on an ancillary device. Furthermore, during at least the transforming steps 11 , 21 , at least a heater and/or a vaping control circuit of the vaping device can be switched off, to preserve power.

The method 100 as described above is intended to be implemented in a vaping device 200 as illustrated in Fig. 5, standalone without communication needed with another external device.

A vaping device 200 generally comprises a main body 201 that a user can handle.

The main body 201 typically comprises a mouthpiece 202 where the user places his mouth to vape. Inside the body 201 , the vaping device 200 can comprise a heater for a substance, either in liquid state or in a solid state, to be heated to be converted into particles small and light enough to be carried in the air for inhalation by a user.

Inside the body 201 , the vaping device 200 can also comprise a vaping control circuit 305 (illustrated in FIG. 6) for controlling the device for a user, as well as a power source 307 (illustrated in FIG. 6 too), like a battery. For example, the power source powers the vaping control circuit in a conventional way.

The vaping device 200 may further include, at its lower end, connectors for connecting the battery to a charger (not shown) supplied with electricity by a suitable transformer or by a USB (Universal Serial Bus) socket for example.

The vaping devices 200 may optionally comprise a user interface including buttons and indicators such as a power button to turn on or off the vaping device, as well as a light indicator associated with the power button for indicating whether the device is on or off. The user interface may also optionally include a screen (not shown) for displaying information for the attention of the user.

According to an example embodiment of the invention, the vaping device 200 here comprises a microprocessor 301 (illustrated in FIG. 6) running firmware configured for implementing the method 100. The functions needed for the method 100 can thus be implemented on the technology platform available.

Permanent memory storage is also necessary for the original cryptographic hashed result, which is determined during the calibration step 10, to be stored as reference data. According to one interesting embodiment, the vaping device may also comprise a biometric sensor 203 for acquiring at least one biometric data set.

For example, the biometric sensor can comprise a physiological sensor, and/or a behavior sensor.

Sensor capable of detecting behavioral property on a vaping device are for example: a motion sensor, including acceleration and gravity sensors; such motion sensor can measure both large movements of the device, or smaller movements and impacts like for instance tapping; absolute positioning to determine the position of the device in space can also be measured, for example by a gravity sensors; a pressure sensor: or example to interact with a hand or a finger of the user to measure pressure exerted on the sensor; momentary switches: these can measure activation (can also be touch sensors); touch screen sensor: all the usual input features, like position/movement within touch areas (might also include a pressure sensor); - timing devices: to be used in tandem with other sensors, like the movement sensor or switches; light sensitive switches: these can detect certain areas of the device being covered by a hand; impedance sensors: these can be used to determine how the device is being gripped.

Then, the following behavior can be measurable for example:

- movement of the device while in the hand of the user;

- button pressure by users’ fingers when pressing buttons;

- grip pressure on the device while handling the device; - tapping a fixed pattern on a touch screen display.

A physiological sensor (that recognize a body part of the user) is for example:

- a fingerprint sensor, a blood vein recognition sensor (for fingertips etc.),

- optical sensor, like a camera, for example for handshape recognition, a facial recognition, including partial facial recognition (like mouth shape) as well as iris scans,

- portable DNA test equipment,

- bio-impedance, which measures a resistance of a body part.

Figure 6 shows a schematic block diagram of a computing device 300 in a vaping device 200 for implementation of one or more embodiments of the method according to the invention, as described above. The computing device 300 comprises for example a communication bus connected to:

- a central processing unit 301, such as a microprocessor, denoted

CPU; - a random access memory 302, denoted RAM, for storing the executable code of the method of embodiments of the invention as well as the registers adapted to record variables and parameters necessary for implementing the method according to embodiments of the method of the invention;

- a read only memory 303, denoted ROM, for storing computer programs for implementing embodiments of the method of the invention;

- an I/O module 304 for receiving data from biometric sensor 203;

The executable code may be stored in the read only memory 303.

The CPU 801 is configured to control and direct the execution of the instructions or portions of software code of the program or programs according to embodiments of the method of the invention, which instructions are stored in one of the aforementioned storage means.

After powering on, the CPU 301 is capable of executing instructions from main RAM memory 302 relating to a software application after those instructions have been loaded from the program ROM 303 for example. Such a software application, when executed by the CPU 301 , causes the steps of the flowcharts of the invention to be performed.

For example, the computing device also comprise a vaping control circuit 305 which is configured to run the vaping device.

To this end, the vaping control circuit 305 typically comprises a heater 306.

For example, the computing device 300 further comprises a power source 307, like a battery, for powering any component of the computing device 300. References used for the figures